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ABSTRACT

THE DARFUR NAM E GAME: USE OF REALPOLITIK BY THE UNITED
NATIONS IN DECISION-M AKING AND INTERVENTION
Angela Overton
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Dawn L. Rothe

Violence has plagued the westernmost region o f Sudan, known as Darfur, since
2003. The conflict contains elements o f political and ethnic divisiveness, desertification,
and resource scarcity. The violence there continues to date. M any have declared
genocide in Darfur while others maintain that the conflict is instead a crim e against
humanity. The labeling o f the conflict is critical because this process determ ines the
interventions available. This paper focuses on the decision-m aking process o f the United
Nations and its Security Council to determine if the labeling o f the conflict impacted the
discourse and intervention decisions by those bodies. Discourse analysis results indicate
that the labeling did im pact intervention decisions and that realpolitik played a large role
in the discourse and decision-making o f the UN Security Council in relation to Darfur.
M ost importantly, labeling the events in D arfur as crimes against humanity and war
crimes permitted the UN and its Security Council to circum vent the intervention mandate
in the Genocide Convention. Finally, the paper suggests that the variable realpolitik be
added to the integrated theory o f state crim e model to bridge the gap between the
criminological and international relations theories in order to better describe and explain
state reaction to the state crim inality o f other states.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Sudan lies on the western shore o f the Red Sea in eastern, sub-Saharan Africa (see
Figure 1). It was colonized by the United Kingdom in 1916 through indirect rule
(M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005), which meant that few m ajor changes were
made in the manner in which the government ran. There were im portant consequences o f
Colonialism, however. One such issue was the diversion o f the flow o f resources through
the capital, Khartoum (M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005), because as funds
and resources were funneled through, the econom ic benefits from Colonization remained

Figure 1. M ap o f Sudan with Darfur and South Sudan Regions Noted.
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Source: Geographic Travels (2011) (see also Appendix C)

in and around the capital city and the Northern Province. This left other parts o f the
country in distress and poverty as Khartoum prospered (M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008;
Prunier 2005). Although Sudan gained independence in the 1950s, the country has been
plagued by intermittent violence. Since 2003, much o f the violence has been, and
remains, concentrated in the westernm ost region o f Sudan known as Darfur, whose
violent roots o f conflict lie in this division o f income and resources that rem ains from
Colonial times (M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005).
Along with resource deprivation, the Darfuri conflict also contains an ethnic
element (M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier 2005). The northern part o f Sudan,
including Khartoum, was traditionally populated by tribes that identified them selves as
Arab, while Darfuri tribes traditionally identified them selves as African (M ullins and
Rothe 2007; 2008). Despite this, the various tribes coexisted in peace and any conflicts
that erupted were resolved amicably. The African and Arab tribes intermarried in this
region for many centuries (M ullins and Rothe 2008). However, politicians running for
office in the late 1960s began to utilize a discourse o f separation and difference that
created a fracture between the Arab and African ethnicities (M ullins and Rothe 2007) that
led to African tribes supporting one candidate and Arabs another. This rhetoric was then
used to maintain the central power and resources in the capital, which led to the neglect
o f Darfur (and other regions) and consequently furthered the divide between the tribes
identifying themselves as Arab and those identifying them selves as African (M ullins and
Rothe 2007). This divisiveness laid the groundwork for violence between those creating
the marginalization and those who were marginalized. In fact:
[Darfur] is widely regarded as the first genocide o f the twenty-first
century: the deliberate slaughter - as well as a slow er death through
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displacement, starvation, thirst, and disease - o f more than 450,000 people
from three tribes (the Fur, Zaghawa, and M asalit) in the D arfur region o f
Sudan. (M arkusen 2009:95)
Hundreds o f thousands have been murdered and displaced. The United Human Rights
Council (2013) estim ates 400,000 killed and 2.5 million displaced by the conflict. O f the
6 million in the region, 4.7 million have been impacted by the violence (United Human
Rights Council 2013).
Although many states and the United N ations (UN) have provided humanitarian
aid, the violence rages on. As one o f the m ajor institutions o f social control, the UN is
charged with addressing conflicts between states and other matters. More recently, this
organization has been called upon to address internal state conflicts that do not cross
international borders, as well (Claude 1996; Evans et al. 2001; Ruggie 2010). In fact, the
United N ations Security Council (UNSC) is the permanent international body tasked with
“maintenance o f international peace and security” (United Nations N.d.). With no
evidence o f cessation o f violence in Darfur, one must question: why has the UN stayed
the course o f hum anitarian intervention? Are there specific duties or responsibilities for
states and international institutions o f social control in the face o f massive loss o f life and
violations o f human rights? How do states and international institutions o f social control
define these conflicts resulting in human rights abuses, death, and displacem ent?
Despite a vast body o f research focused on Darfur, relatively little has addressed
the definitional com ponent o f the conflict— genocide versus crimes against hum anity1—

1 The m ajor differentiation between crimes against humanity and genocide is the intent
behind the execution o f the violence. Genocide is a crime that intends to exterm inate a
group based on a shared characteristic and is systematic in this desire to eliminate said
group. Alternately, crim es against humanity may involve sim ilar acts o f violence but
lacks the intent required for genocide.
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and the repercussions that accompany these labels. The definition o f the situation is vital
because these labels dictate the array o f interventions available. In fact, genocide is
unique in international law because it is the only crime that requires intervention in
accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishm ent o f the
Crime o f Genocide (United Nations 1948) (see next chapter for a detailed explanation).
This work focuses on this labeling process o f the conflict in Darfur to understand the
international political response and the decision-m aking processes o f the UNSC and its
permanent m em ber states (P5) in relation to intervention in the conflict.
The conflict in Darfur has sparked much attention, as have the interventions
applied to the conflict. There is an abundance o f scholarly literature available regarding
the prolonged hostilities. For example, law scholars have analyzed the conflict from a
legalistic perspective (e.g., Happold 2006; Jafari and W illiams 2005; W illiams et al.
2004), while political science scholars have focused on the state and international politics
impacting the continued violence (e.g., Collier 2008; Heinze 2007). Intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs) such as the United N ations (UN) and the African Union (AU;
formerly known as the Organization for African Unity), as well as nongovernm ental
organizations (NGOs) including Human Rights W atch (HRW ) and Am nesty International
(Al), have also written reports docum enting various aspects o f the conflict. These
writings include inform ation regarding displacement, victim ization, specific events
occurring as the violence continues, peace talks, and aid that has been sent to the region
(e.g., Amnesty International 2009; Human Rights Watch 2004; 2005a; b; 2006a; b; c; d;
2008a; b; Organization for African Unity 2004a; b; 2005; United N ations 20051; 2008j).
Overall, however, this body o f literature neglects the definitional labeling o f the conflict.
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Due to the importance o f genocide in international law, one would expect
criminological literature related to the conflict in D arfur to explore the labeling process
and associated repercussions. Yet, crim inological literature has essentially ignored this
facet o f the conflict with a few notable exceptions (i.e., Hagan and Rym ond-Richmond
2009; Heinze 2007; Jafari and W illiams 2005; M ullins and Rothe 2007; Rothe and
M ullins 2007; Straus 2005). Each o f these will be discussed at length in the literature
review. In addition to the four crim inological analyses o f the labeling process, there are
three in other disciplines that focus on the labeling o f the conflict: Jafari and W illiams
(2005), Heinze (2007), and W illiams and colleagues (2004). These works analyze the
content o f the discourse related to D arfur in relation to the labeling o f the conflict but do
so through a legal or politico-legal framework.
Legal and political analyses are only two o f the many approaches taken to study
the conflict in D arfur and the associated definition o f the situation. Using a historical
analysis to study the conflict in Darfur and it similarities/differences to previous
genocides is helpful in understanding the origin o f such conflicts. However, historical
analysis will not get at the heart o f this work, which seeks to understand why effective
intervention has not been im plem ented to stem the violence. Because intervention has
not occurred in response to previous genocide events, historical analyses fall short.
Political science analyses also fail to reach an understanding o f intervention decisions
because they center on governments and state organizations alone. International
relations, which is a branch o f political science, is a m ajor contributor to this work but
does not allow for a holistic understanding o f the decision-m aking process because it
does not ask how and why such decisions are made. Focusing solely on the decisions o f
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the UN and m em ber states removes the gravity and importance o f understanding those
decisions in the context o f the millions o f lives impacted by these egregious crimes. In
fact, genocide has often been identified as the crim e o f all crimes, thus placing it directly
in the scope o f criminology.
Criminological analysis permits a concurrent study o f the crime itself, as well as
the measures undertaken to prevent or stop the violence. It is here that a m ore holistic
understanding o f the conflict in Darfur may be found. It is this lens through w hich the
following research questions will be addressed: do those tasked with intervention in the
G enocide Convention circumvent that responsibility? If so, what justifications are used?
It is crucial to determine if these decisions are influenced by what has been
described as realpolitik2. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009), M ullins and Rothe
(2007; 2008), Rothe and M ullins (2007) have provided criminological case studies on the
conflict and discussed intervention and realpolitik in brief. However, there is a gap in
this literature because o f a lack o f criminological studies focusing on the decision-m aking
process o f the UNSC and its m em ber states in relation to genocide intervention. No
previous works have delved into this process and applied crim inological theory to
understanding the how and why o f decision-making related to Darfur. Further, I seek to
determine how and why particular interventions, including the use o f force, have been
avoided. It is here that this work is vital in filling gaps in the existing literature. M ost

2 The term realpolitik was coined by August Ludwig von Rochau (1972 [1853]) and is
defined as a state’s own self interest. “N ation-states pursue their own national interests
and conceive these national interests prim arily in terms o f power” (Totten 2013:7-8).
National Security Council Paper N um ber 68 (National Security Council 1950)
established the three com ponents now com monly attributed to realpolitik: political
interests, military interests, and economic interests.
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importantly, 1 seek to understand why the cries o f “never again” related to genocide3
remain em pty promises. To do so, I focus on the UN conflict intervention decision
making process.
Conflict intervention falls under the purview o f the United N ations as the major
agent o f international social control and provider o f international peace and security. To
that end, the UN has im plem ented m echanism s that seek to prevent a host o f prohibited
behaviors that include wars o f aggression, violence against women, and violations o f
human rights, among others. The crim e o f genocide is prohibited through the UN
Convention on the Prevention and Punishm ent o f the Crime o f Genocide (1948).
Prior to delving into discussions o f genocide and international violence, Chapter
II reviews the foundational and relevant literature. Chapter III proceeds w ith the
theoretical foundations that inform this work, including R othe’s (2009b) integrated
theory o f state crime, realism, and realpolitik. Chapter IV details the m ethods employed
in this research. Chapter V provides a brief narrative o f Sudan and the events occurring
in Darfur. Chapter VI contains the data findings. Chapter VII contains the theoretical
analysis. Finally, Chapter VIII explains the policy implications, future directions for
research, and conclusion.

3 After the Holocaust, many cried “never again” w ould genocide occur. This has been
the cry before, during, and after every genocide. In fact, Power (N.d.: 1) called this “the
w orld’s most unfulfilled prom ise.”
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Language and discourse are used daily to express ideology, execute personal
interactions, and explain complex situations. This may be done through speech, writing,
electronic com munication, the media, and hundreds o f other outlets for communication.
This language and discourse is often seen as merely a method o f interaction, leaving its
deeper m eanings and latent im plications overlooked. Bourdieu ([1982] 2003:2) explains
that:
everyday linguistic exchanges [are] situated encounters between agents endowed
with socially structured resources and competencies, in such a way that every
linguistic interaction... bears the traces o f the social structure that it both expresses
and helps to reproduce.
An exam ination o f the discourse used to describe events, conflicts, em otions, political
positions, and millions o f other concepts is critical to truly understanding what the
originator is not only saying or writing, but also what may be im plied or assum ed through
the discourse itself. In fact, Bourdieu ([1982] 2003:164) explains that language may be a
form o f “symbolic pow er... that invisible pow er which can be exercised only with the
com plicity o f those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they
themselves exercise it.” It is for these reasons that an analysis o f the discourse and words
used to describe the conflict in Darfur may shed light on the latent factors underlying the
decision-m aking process.
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THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND ITS OBLIGATIONS
Labeling the situation a crime against humanity rather than genocide im pacts how
the conflict is defined, understood, perceived, and identified by those in power. Labeling
dictates possible interventions available to address the situation. U nderstanding the
events and intervention decisions in Darfur requires some discussion o f genocide and the
unique mechanisms o f social control at the international level in response to this crime.
G enocide1 may be generally defined as the systematic killing o f individuals based on a
shared characteristic and seeks to intentionally eliminate the entire group exhibiting that
characteristic. These behaviors were evident in the genocide that occurred during the
Holocaust, which served as the impetus to the creation o f the Genocide Convention. This
work centers on obligations engendered by becom ing party to the G enocide Convention.

1 Genocide was codified in The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishm ent o f the
Crime o f Genocide (UNGC; also known simply as the Genocide Convention). The
Convention was approved by the UN in 1948 and became enforceable in January 1951
(1948).
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as:
Article 1. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether com m itted in
time o f peace or in time o f war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish.
Article 11. In the present Convention, genocide means any o f the following acts
com mitted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members o f the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members o f the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions o f life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children o f the group to another group.
Article III. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to com mit genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide. (United N ations 1948)
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These responsibilities take two forms: those o f individual states and those at the
international level. These are separate and distinct debates that require discussion.
Article 1 o f the Genocide Convention indicates that parties, which are individual
states, bear some responsibility to “prevent and punish” genocide (United Nations 1948).
However, these individual responsibilities are by no means straightforward. Some
suggest that individual states bear the burden o f protection from genocide while others
deny that such an intervention responsibility exists. Kelly (2007-2008:159) sums the
debate up by detailing:
[t]wo schools o f thought are form ing...T he non-interventionist school denies a
legal duty based on a plain reading o f the Genocide Convention. This school
admits, however, the moral and political responsibility, and even advocates
undertaking all other actions short o f m ilitary intervention (econom ic sanctions,
embargoes, etc.). The option o f intervention is also on the table, under a newly
developed theory o f a sovereignty waiver if states com m it genocide against their
own people. W hether or not to exercise that option is in the discretion o f each
state. M eanwhile, the interventionist school is a natural outgrowth o f the post-w ar
human rights movement. This school holds that a duty to intervene arises once
genocide has been determined, and states with the capacity to act that do not do so
are in breach o f an international legal obligation. W idespread acceptance o f
humanitarian intervention by states, as well as the U.N. leadership in the 1990’s,
forms the basis for this school’s underlying theory. Coupled with widespread
acknow ledgem ent that Rw anda’s genocide was preventable (followed by the
public contrition by states, including the United States), this school relies heavily
on the moral and political weight o f 800,000 dead Rwandans to buttress its legal
argument.
Further, Toope (2006:189) explains the prevention o f genocide as, “an erga omnes
o b lig atio n ...o f such importance to the international com m unity that all states have a care
towards its fulfillm ent.. .individual states are burdened with a duty under customary law
to enforce the obligation.” Both sides o f the debate do acknowledge some sort o f
individual state responsibility inherent in the Convention (Kelly 2007-2008). However,
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the two schools o f thought differ greatly in terms o f appropriate intervention, specifically
in relation to the use o f military force.
Those believing that individual states are tasked with military intervention explain
that such intervention is required by the Convention. For exam ple, Brunnee (2007:50)
states that:
each State has a legal obligation to participate in protective effo rts... As we have
seen, the Draft Articles are careful in sketching out the measures that individual
States can take in the nam e o f collective concern, especially as far as the use o f
force is concerned. Here, the concept o f responsibility to protect clarifies that, in
cases o f extreme crisis, the duty to cooperate to bring an end to grave human
rights abuses does extend to military measures.
Brunnee (2007) is only one exam ple o f those who conceptualize individual state
responsibility as encom passing a use o f force com ponent — but this individual use o f
force is far from com monly understood under the Genocide Convention.
M ilitaristic intervention aside, an accepted legal norm o f individual state
responsibility leaves several questions unanswered. Exactly how or when should such an
intervention occur? Is every state responsible to intervene? How would that work in
practice?
Although the Convention is very ambiguous in respect to individual state
intervention (e.g., Fowler 2006; Kelly 2007-2008), the United States (US) m ust have
perceived some intervention responsibility because politicians danced around use o f the
genocide descriptor in relation to Rwanda (e.g., Kagan 2006; Power 2002; N.d.). Power
(2001:6) explains:
[a] discussion paper on Rwanda, prepared by an official in the Office o f the
Secretary o f Defense and dated May 1, testifies to the nature o f official thinking.
Regarding issues that m ight be brought up at the next interagency w orking group,
it stated[:] Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an international
investigation o f human rights abuses and possible violations o f the genocide
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convention. Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—
Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. governm ent] to actually "do something. "
[Emphasis added.]
This US policy docum ent confirms that there may be some obligation perceived,
although the level or requirem ents o f such responsibility rem ains ambiguous.
If intervention by individual states is so ambiguous as to prevent action, then the
explicit responsibility to intervene in cases o f genocide must fall to some organization at
the international level. In fact, the Convention (1948) specifically delineates this
responsibility to “com petent organs o f the United N ations to take such action under the
Charter o f the United N ations” which may only be understood as the U N SC 2.
If the UNSC is ultimately tasked with genocide intervention under the
Convention, what interventions are required? Current UN Secretary-General Ban Kimoon (N.d.) outlined the intervention obligations o f both individual states and the UN:
[a]t the [UN W orld] Summit, world leaders also agreed that when any State fails to
meet that responsibility all States (the “international com m unity”) are responsible for
helping to protect peoples threatened with such crim es and that they should first use
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful methods. Then, if peaceful methods are
inadequate and if national authorities are “manifestly failing” to protect their
populations, they should act collectively in a “timely and decisive m anner” - through
the UN Security Council and in accordance with the Charter o f the UN - by using
force.
Power (2002:504) calls this progression the “continuum o f intervention.” This
continuum may be conceptualized as least-aggressive interventions on one end, such as
humanitarian aid (Jones 2006), moving to mid-range actions, such as sanctions (Jones
2006), and ending with the most aggressive, epitom ized by militaristic force (Jones

2The UNSC is comprised o f five permanent members, known as the “Big Five” or
“ Permanent Five” : China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom o f Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States o f America, along with ten rotating
members on terms o f two years each (United N ations Security Council N.d.).
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2006). Ki-moon (N.d.) provides more detail in stating that prevention o f genocide is
vital. To that end, UN Peacekeepers may be called upon to intervene. These
peacekeepers may be charged with a variety o f tasks, including disarm ament, protection,
and situation monitoring. Once all peaceful m echanism s have proven unfruitful, Kimoon (N.d.) states that the next step is to “take swift action, including the use o f military
force.” Lippman (2008:428) elaborates:
the international com munity through the United Nations has the responsibility to
protect populations from genocide. This entails an obligation to take collective
action through the Security Council under Chapters VI and VII ‘should peaceful
m eans be inadequate and national authorities are m anifestly failing to protect their
populations from genocide.’
Use o f force and security decisions rest solely in the hands o f the UNSC and are at the
center o f many intervention debates.
The UN C harter (1945) specifies that nonprocedural issues require nine favorable
votes by members o f the UNSC, including all five permanent members. Overt use o f
force without perm ission o f the sitting state governm ent for protection o f civilians is not
codified in the United N ations Charter. However, the UN has acknowledged and
accepted such responsibility in the World Summit Outcome Document (W SOD) and
embedded authorization to employ such force in the UN Charter Chapter VII mandate
governing the use o f force:
[w]e [the UN] reaffirm that the relevant provisions o f the Charter are sufficient to
address the full range o f threats to international peace and security. We further
reaffirm the authority o f the Security Council to mandate coercive action to
maintain and restore international peace and security. (United Nations
2005a:Paragraph 79)
Acknow ledgem ent o f a responsibility to protect aside, intervention into intrastate conflict
remains under much debate internationally.
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The Genocide Convention (1948:Article 8) specifies that intervention is
warranted and that, “ [a]ny Contracting Party may call upon the com petent organs o f the
United Nations to take such action under the Charter o f the United N ations as they
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression o f acts o f genocide.” The UN
organization referenced here is the Security Council. Although signatory states may
request that the UNSC intervene in cases o f genocide, the UNSC itself is required to act
to prevent or punish genocide. In fact, genocide holds a unique place in international law
as it is the only crime that triggers a required intervention by the UNSC through Article 1
o f the UNGC (1948): “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, w hether
com mitted in time o f peace or in time o f war, is a crime under international law which
they undertake to prevent and to punish.” By authoring the docum ent, the UN is the
primary contracting party and thus duly bound to this responsibility through the
appropriate mechanism to address the problem: the UNSC.
The intervention responsibility, however, has been circumvented as evidenced in
the more recent cases o f genocide (e.g., Rwanda, Yugoslavia). In response to this
inaction, an international panel o f scholars convened the International C om m ission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). They focused on a central question: “the socalled ‘right o f humanitarian intervention’: when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to
take coercive— and in particular military— action against another state for the purpose o f
protecting people at risk in that other state” (Evans et al. 2001 :vii). The ICISS report
(Evans et al. 2001) situates intervention within the context o f a state’s duty to protect its
citizens. If the state does not, or is not willing to, execute this responsibility, the
international political com munity is tasked with providing protection to the citizens o f
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said state. The responsibility to protect (R2P) entails three com ponents: “the
responsibility to prevent[,]... the responsibility to react[,]... and the responsibility to
rebuild” (Evans et al. 2001 :xi). Finally, this responsibility to protect is structured in a tri
level hierarchy: the first line o f defense belongs to the state involved; the second with
“domestic authorities acting in partnership with external actors” ; and lastly and
ultimately, with the states o f the world both individually and collectively (Evans et al.
2001:49).
This em erging responsibility to protect doctrine is im portant to the D arfur case
because it is central to understanding the intervention decision discourse. This is a major
concern o f this study because the responsibility to protect doctrine entails a legal, ethical,
and moral responsibility to intervene in cases o f genocide, crim es against humanity, or
w ar crim es w here the state does not provide adequate protection o f its citizens (Evans et
al. 2001). This responsibility is collectively shouldered by every state (United Nations
2004x). Such intervention may take the form o f aid for victim s or, as a last resort, the use
o f m ilitary force (Evans et al. 2001). To date, the R2P has not been codified into
international law and, thus, is not binding (Luck 2010; M ennecke 2009) “but is often
described as ‘evolving’ in that direction” (M ennecke 2009:170).
The responsibility to protect against genocide, war crimes, and crim es against
humanity was embraced internationally at the 2005 UN W orld Summit (Hubert 2010)
and in the W orld Summit Outcome Document (W SOD) (United Nations 2005a). It was
also confirmed by the UNSC in 2006 (United N ations Security Council 2006). Both
former United N ations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and current Secretary-General Ban
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Ki-moon are major supporters o f the responsibility to protect and have sought to bring
international attention and acceptance to the concept. Ki-moon (2007:1) stated that:
[a]ll the w orld’s Governments have agreed in principle to the responsibility to
protect. Our challenge now is to give real meaning to the concept, by taking steps
to make it operational. Only then will it truly give hope to those facing genocide,
war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Preventing genocide is
a collective and individual responsibility. Everyone has a role to play:
Governments, the media, civil society organizations, religious groups, and each
and every one o f us. Let us build a global partnership against genocide. Let us
protect populations from genocide when their own Government cannot or will
not.
This acceptance o f the responsibility to protect those unprotected or harm ed by their own
govem m ent(s) is inherent in the Genocide Convention and the responsibility to protect
doctrine and falls under the mandate o f the United Nations and its Security Council, as a
primary agents o f international social control.
The Genocide Convention and responsibility to protect doctrine are important
international instrum ents aimed at protecting civilians and preventing genocide; both are
very idealistic. Thus, it is important to understand how these protection mechanisms
work realistically versus theoretically. To that end, the following section focuses on the
manner in which the conflict in Darfur has been previously analyzed. It also includes a
section on realpolitik, which is hypothesized to influence intervention decisions in this
case.

LITERATURE ON THE LABELING OF THE DARFURI CONFLICT
The authors contributing to the discourse o f the conflict in Darfur have taken
different perspectives. The vast majority o f these works are case studies that center on
the origin o f the conflict and the underlying causes o f the continuing violence. However,
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few works differentiate the conflict itself from the discourse used to describe the conflict.
These are, in fact, separate and distinct concerns. There are only seven works that focus
on the labeling and associated repercussions o f such labels (Hagan and RymondRichmond 2009; Heinze 2007; Jafari and W illiams 2005; M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008;
Rothe and M ullins 2007; W illiams et al. 2004).
Three o f these seven discourse-focused works are outside o f the field o f
criminology. Jafari and W illiams (2005) center their discussion on the labeling o f the
conflict from a legal perspective and frame the conflict in term s o f the legal ramifications
o f these labels. Heinze (2007), however, analyzes these conflicts from a political
perspective. Jafari and W illiams (2005) seek to challenge the U N ’s Report on the
International Com m ission o f Inquiry into D arfur (RICID) determ ination that “in some
instances individuals, including government officials, may com m it acts with genocidal
intent,” while abstaining from defining the conflict itself as genocide due to a lack o f
intent to exterminate the Darfuri (see Chapter VI for a detailed analysis o f this report).
The authors explain that the UN report determ ined that the “intent was to ‘drive victims
from their homes for the purposes o f counter-insurgency w arfare’” (Jafari and W illiams
2005). The authors com pare the situation in Darfur to Rwanda, which was retroactively
defined as genocide. In order to deconstruct the logic o f the U N ’s determ ination, they
compare these two contem porary conflicts. One o f the m ajor concerns identified by
Jafari and W illiams (2005) is that the violence in both Darfur and Rwanda has/d multiple
roots-causes or goals but that does not disqualify either conflict as genocide. Another
flaw is that the UN report indicates that there was selective killing with some left alive in
the targeted villages. These individuals, however, may have later been killed for other
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reasons, such as being accused o f perpetrating crimes. The report indicates that this is a
lack o f intent, but Jafari and W illiams (2005) explain that “secondary m otives’" do not
mitigate the genocide occurring in Darfur or in Rwanda. Jafari and W illiams (2005)
describe the U N ’s use o f “word gam es” by finding that genocidal acts, but not genocide,
have occurred in Darfur. Additionally, they state that the reason for these “word gam es”
is to circum vent the G enocide C onvention’s intervention trigger.
W illiams and colleagues (2004) share the position o f Jafari and W illiams (2005)
by stating that the existing conflict in the country is extraneous to a determ ination o f
genocide. They explain that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
faced a sim ilar challenge due to an existing conflict between the Rwandan Armed Forces
(RAF) and Rw anda Patriotic Front (RPF). However, the ICTR determined that, “the fact
that the genocide took place while the RAF was in conflict with the RPF can in no way
be considered as an extenuating circumstance for it” (as cited in W illiams et al. 2004:10).
They further explain that this is no different than the war between the Sudan Liberation
Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality M ovement (JEM ) and does not mean that
genocide has not occurred.
The use o f this genocide label versus other term inology is also analyzed in
H einze’s (2007) work. H einze’s (2007) views are similar to Jafari and W illiams (2005)
in that he focuses on the “word gam es” related to the genocide while also com paring the
conflicts in Rwanda and Darfur. Heinze (2007:359) centers his work on the “rhetoric o f
genocide” and the United States’ refusal to identify genocide in Rwanda despite the
evidence for doing so. He also focuses on the alternative willingness o f the US to
proclaim genocide in Darfur with far less supporting evidence at the time. Heinze (2007)
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specifically mentions realpolitik in his narrative in regard to the m anner in which the
Clinton and G.W. Bush adm inistrations approached the definition o f the conflicts in
Rwanda and Darfur. This is particularly significant, as realpolitik is the variable o f
interest in this research. Additionally, he takes great care in explaining that the Clinton
adm inistration did not use the word genocide (instead choosing the label “genocidal
acts”) because o f the desire to avoid the intervention trigger embedded in the G enocide
Convention. However, Heinze (2007:373) explains that “original and secondary sources
on the Genocide Convention now suggest that the treaty does not confer an obligation to
intervene m ilitarily” (em phasis in original). This implies that international legal scholars
had developed a different interpretation o f the Genocide Convention during the time
between the conflicts in Rwanda and Darfur. The Bush adm inistration was then willing
to state that genocide was occurring in D arfur “w ithout an expectation o f intervention”
(Heinze 2007:362), as the more recent US interpretation o f the Genocide Convention
simply requires some sort o f action to prevent or punish future genocidal acts. In
September 2004, speeches by both US Secretary o f State Colin Powell (Powell 2004a; b)
and then President George W. Bush (United N ations 2004i; 2007b; r) identified the acts
in Darfur as constituting genocide. It was after these statements that the US requested the
UNSC investigate the situation. It seems to be that this reinterpretation o f the Genocide
Convention buttresses Pow ell’s statement that “some seem to have been waiting for this
determination o f genocide to take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by
this determ ination” (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009:xviii). However, there is much
international legal scholarship that refutes nonintervention as an acceptable course o f
action associated with a determination o f genocide as described by Heinze (2007).
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This genocide descriptor is very important to understanding how the term inology
applied to the conflict dictates the arsenal o f interventions that may be utilized to address
the violence. This was discussed in both Jafari and W illiams (2005) and Heinze (2007).
However, they do not situate themselves in the crim inological literature as does this
research.
The four existing works that are situated within the crim inological literature
(Hagan and Rym ond-Richm ond 2009; M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Rothe and M ullins
2007) discuss, in a cursory manner, realpolitik in relation to the labeling o f the conflict
These works do not seek to determine or understand if, how, or why realpolitik may
influence the labeling o f the conflict. N onetheless, these four works remain highly
relevant because the authors frame the conflict through a crim inological lens.
Hagan and Rym ond-Richm ond (2009) attempted to determine the num ber o f
deaths and displacem ent that have occurred throughout the course o f the conflict.
Further, they focus on the “flip-flopping” associated with determining w hether the crimes
meet the definitional requirem ent o f genocide or should be classified as crim es against
humanity. This work is a m ajor step in advancing the integration o f victim ology and
genocide research, which has been long overlooked by criminology. Victim ology in
humanitarian conflicts has always been a high priority for hum an rights and aid
organizations, but rarely have those instrum ents been used to better understand the
conflicts from a crim inological perspective. The authors also make great strides in
advancing the study o f the crim inology o f genocide by applying crim inological theory to
the events, resulting in their collective action theory o f genocide. This theory utilizes
concepts from techniques o f neutralization, anom ie, differential association, collective
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efficacy, and opportunity structures (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2009). The theory
may be summarized as aimed at understanding the “social efficacy by m ilitia leaders in
mobilizing and organizing genocidal violence as a joint criminal enterprise” (Hagan and
Rymond-Richmond 2009:136). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) do offer
theoretical insight to the conflict but do not delve into the intricacies o f the conflict
labeling.
M ullins and Rothe (2007) and M ullins and Rothe (2008) discuss the importance
o f the label applied to the conflict. Both lay out the case study o f the Darfuri conflict
with a historical contextual description o f the conflict and the factors associated with it.
However, these works differ from Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2009) as they advance
the study o f the conflict by undertaking a discussion o f both individual state and
international societal repercussions that identifying the conflict as genocide may entail.
In fact, it was a single sentence in M ullins and Rothe (2008:185) that sparked this work:
“The selection o f term inologies here is critical, both legally and politically.”
M ullins and Rothe (2007) use crim inological theory at multiple levels o f analysis
through the application o f Rothe’s (2006) integrated theory o f state crim e’s com ponents
o f motivations, opportunities, controls, and constraints. Although realpolitik is implied in
the integrated theory, it is not fully explicated in the work. It is here that this work seeks
to add to the criminological literature by exploring realpolitik as the variable exerting the
most influence on the decision-makers within the UNSC both individually and
collectively.
The fourth and final criminological work on the labeling o f the conflict in D arfur
is Rothe and M ullins (2007). It is this work that is most closely associated with the
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research at hand. The authors detail and define the concepts o f genocide and crimes
against humanity as laid out in treaty and international law. Further, they deconstruct the
decision by the U N ’s Com m ission o f Inquiry into Darfur (UNCID) indicating that the
conflict is a crime against humanity. There are three central questions that must be
answered in the affirm ative for a determ ination o f genocide to be made: “ (1) Did the
actions exist on a widespread and systematic level? (2) Do tribal groups constitute a
protected population under the genocide and crim es against humanity conventions? (3)
Was the specific intent o f destroying an entire category o f persons present?” (Rothe and
M ullins 2007:20). Each o f the three questions is analyzed at length and the logic o f the
U N ’s decision is challenged draw ing on evidence from the conflict. The authors find that
the three critical elem ents for genocide are present. Thus, there must be other reasons to
apply term inology to the conflict that is neither factually or legally accurate.
Rothe and M ullins (2007) undertake a discussion o f the im portance o f the label
applied to the conflict and the associated ramifications. They state that “ W estern powers
who hold permanent seats in the UNSC, and thereby veto power, developed their own
strategies and agendas for the continent [o f A frica]” (Rothe and M ullins 2007:101).
Further, President Bill Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 25, “in essence...states
that the US will be selective in what peacekeeping actions it supports both w ith its UNSC
vote and its own troops” (Rothe and M ullins 2007:102).

It was these two statements that

pushed the current work into fruition, and it is here that this research endeavors to situate
itself in an effort to understand the decision-m aking process by the United States and
other members o f the UNSC in relation to intervention in Darfur.
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It is important to note that these four crim inological works centering on D arfur
(Hagan and Rym ond-Richm ond 2009; M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Rothe and M ullins
2007) were completed in 2007, 2008, and 2009, a mere four to six years, respectively,
after the conflict began. However, since 2009, there have been no criminological
analyses o f the conflict, now in its eleventh year, and there have been no further attempts
by crim inologists to understand the decision-m aking process o f states in relation to
international conflict intervention. It is in this literature gap in which this work is
situated.
The m ajor contribution o f this w ork is to explicitly apply realpolitik to an analysis
o f the decision-m aking process o f the UN and UNSC in relation to Darfur through the
integrated theory o f state crime. State crim e may be defined as:
[a]ny action that violates international public law, and/or a state’s own domestic
law when these actions are com m itted by individual actors acting on behalf of, or
in the name o f the state, even when such acts are motivated by their personal
econom ical, political, and ideological interests. (Rothe 2009b:6)
Under this definition, the genocide in D arfur is a state crime. Analyses utilizing the
integrated theory o f state crime have often drawn on realpolitik, as states frequently place
their own legitimacy and self-interests above all else. For example, a state may be
quashing threats to its own legitimacy by executing genocide or crimes against humanity.
State crim e has always implicitly considered the economic, military, and political goals
o f states in relation to understanding state criminality. This is not the only application o f
the theory, however.
The integrated theory o f state crime has also been used to understand the reaction
o f states to the state crim inality o f others. I hypothesize that this reaction is influenced by
realpolitik. For example, does the longstanding oil trade relationship between Sudan and
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China mitigate the m anner in which China voted in relation to D arfur conflict
interventions? Could it be that Chinese economic interests may be impacted by certain
interventions into the conflict? This is an application o f realpolitik-influenced decision
making that this project hopes to shed light upon. It is also an exam ple by which the
integrated theory o f state crime may be used to understand the reaction o f states to the
state crim inality o f others. Those who have w ritten on the reaction to state crim inality
and have applied realpolitik to the issues are discussed in the following section.
Steinmetz (2012) and Rothe and Steinmetz (2013) analyze the m anner in which
the US reacted to the leaking o f classified inform ation by W ikiLeaks and found
realpolitik to be a factor. The focus on state security and legitimacy at all costs was at the
root o f the treatment o f Private First Class Bradley M anning, the w histleblow er in the
case. This state reaction as seen through the lens o f realpolitik explains the internal
decision-making process related to the case. This concept may also be extrapolated to
illustrate the ways that states react to the crim inality o f other states, as well. These
individual state reactions by the Permanent Five (P5) on the UNSC are especially
important in relation to this case.
Several scholars have analyzed the behavior o f the P5 through a lens o f
realpolitik, finding that it does influence individual decision-making. Logically,
therefore, realpolitik must also ultimately impact UNSC interventions. In illustration o f
this point, Forsythe (2012:841) asks critical questions about the use o f realpolitik by the
UNSC:
[a]re they consistently com mitted to holding individuals responsible for violations
o f international law as a feature o f principled world order after the Cold W ar? Or
do their policies reflect mostly varying tactical maneuvers put at the service o f
expedient notions o f narrow national interests?
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However, Totten (2013:217) sees this as a foregone conclusion: “ [r]ealpolitik, o f course.
drives decision making at the national and international levels, including at the UNSC
and among the members o f the P5” (Totten 2013:217). Further, Forsythe (2012:841)
explains that “ [i]n much foreign policy, the reality is that political choice drives reference
to law and legal interpretation. Thus, many analysts conclude that the Security Council is
first a political body and only secondarily a legal one.” This is realpolitik at work.
If one accepts this perspective, intervention decisions made by the UNSC may
seek to serve the interests o f the P5 prim arily before executing its mandate o f ensuring
international peace and security secondarily. In term s o f intervention decisions, Forsythe
(2012:842) explains that:
the most important members o f the Security Council usually approach the
subjects o f criminal law not prim arily or uniquely with a long term and strategic
view o f what should transpire for the com m on good in a lawful world order, but
rather with strong consideration o f how they can adequately m anage to protect
their im mediate subjective national interests given various pressures and pow er
realities. As one scholar [John G. Stoessinger,] perceptively noticed some time
ago, the m ajor states “have tried to use the United Nations as a vehicle for the
advancement o f their individual, antithetical foreign-policy interests.
Forsythe (Forsythe 2012:852) further illustrates the point in use o f this example:
[ajfter the Prosecutor had secured arrest warrants for Sudanese President Om ar
Hassan al-Bashir and others, China received al-Bashir on an official visit in 2011,
rather than arresting him. Other states, like Kenya, also hosted him rather than
apprehending him and turning him over to ICC authorities. While there were
more than thirty African states that were party to the Rome Statute, there was
growing concern across Africa about the ICC. In some circles o f African opinion,
people believed that the Prosecutor had not paid sufficient attention to African
views regarding when arrest warrants were appropriate. Again, one can see that
Chinese policy was affected by its many African contacts: while it was reluctant
to exercise a veto in criminal law matters, it was not really com mitted to vigorous
action by the ICC and its prosecutor. Especially when developing countries were
not enthusiastic about ICC actions, China limited its cooperation as well.
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This is not the only instance o f such realpolitik-influenced decision-m aking by members
o f the P5. There are numerous exam ples detailed in the works o f these scholars and
others.
The role o f realpolitik in P5 decision-making behavior is at the center o f this
work. Realpolitik appears to exert influence over individual state reaction to the
crim inality o f other states. Realpolitik also appears to impact intervention decisions by
the P5. Totten (2013:219) sums the role o f realpolitik, state reaction, and the P5 in this
manner:
many, if not most, o f the P 5’s votes regarding intervention in genocide in the past
have been driven by realpolitik. In other words, the P5 have not been concerned
primarily with the fate o f the potential victim s o f genocide but much more
focused on w hether intervening would be good for them selves or their allies. As
the cliche goes, nation states do not have consciences. Concom itantly, the type o f
mission— Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace enforcem ent) o f the
Charter o f the United Nations— is largely dictated by the P5 as well. Thus, instead
o f sending a robust mission in a timely fashion with a mandate that allow s the
m ission’s troops to handle a jo b properly, the P5 play politics and often approve
missions that are sorely inadequate for the job. This is true for a whole host o f
reasons, but the main point here is that the P5 virtually take on the God-like role
o f deciding who will live and who will die.
It is here that this work situates itself, within the integrated theory o f state crime, by
analyzing state reaction to the state crime o f others, namely the genocide in Darfur. The
theory underlying this project is discussed in the theoretical framework that follows.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAM EW ORK

A holistic understanding o f com plex events, such as crimes against humanity,
genocide, or states’ responses to these crim es com m itted by other states, requires the
application o f theory and concepts from a variety o f disciplines. This work utilizes the
integrated theory o f state crime to explain state crim inality as well as issues associated
with controlling such acts. In relation to the conflict in Darfur, the theory will be used to
explain states’ reactions to the crim es o f Sudan against Darfuri including the decision
making at the UNSC. The use o f the integrated theory to understand states’ reactions to
the crim inality o f others has never been fully outlined in previous research, especially in
relation to the defining o f such behaviors as crimes. Accordingly, a discussion o f the
integrated theory o f state crim e follows; the com ponents o f organizational and
international relations theories im plicit in the theory will be drawn out m ore fully. A
discussion is provided detailing why bringing these theoretical perspectives to a more
central role in the integrated theory o f state crim e may provide additional answers to the
processes o f state control responses that are addressed in this work.

INTEGRATED THEORY OF STATE CRIM E
For many decades, crim inological theory has focused on offenses com m itted by
those without great econom ic or social pow er (Barak 1990), with an inordinate em phasis
on street crime (Rothe 2009b). An intellectual shift in the latter part o f the 20th century
brought about novel ways o f thinking and theorizing about crime, including research
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focused on the specific subsets o f the population that were under-researched in previous
traditional crim inological theories. This approach led to several new theories that were
centered on populations or crimes that went further than much o f the traditional
crim inological theories. This period also brought theoretical integration with
crim inology and other fields to better understand phenomena. One o f these em erging
multidisciplinary theories was the integrated theory o f state crime. It encom passes both
traditional crim inological theories and concepts from other disciplines to understand state
crime. It has often been used with a focus on controls, or lack o f effective controls, that
may lead to state criminality.
Theoretical frameworks utilized to analyze state crimes are varied. The most
com prehensive theoretical frameworks com bine existing crim inological theories into a
more integrated approach in an effort to holistically understand state crime. The first
theoretical framework was proposed by Kram er and M ichalowski in their (1990)
integrated theory o f state-corporate crim e in which they discuss the crim inal collusion
between states and organizations. This theory was further elaborated upon by Kauzlarich
and Kramer (1998:148), who identify “three catalysts for action[:]...(a) motivation or
performance em phasis, (b) opportunity structure, and (c) the operationality o f social
control” (see also Kram er and M ichalowski 2006). M otivations are the factors that make
the com m ission o f deviance an attractive option. Opportunities are created when
deviance is permitted or may be executed under a specific set o f circumstances. Controls
are m echanism s o f social control that prevent the deviance from occurring. Controls
must fail if deviance is to occur. Further, these catalysts are analyzed at three levels:
institutional environm ent, organizational, and interactional (Kauzlarich and K ramer 1998;
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Kramer and Michalowski 2006) which stem from existing crim inological theories used to
study organizational deviance (see also Kramer, M ichalowski, and Kauzlarich 2002).
Kramer and M ichalow ski’s (1990) state-corporate crim e theory was later revised
by Kauzlarich and K ramer (1998) and further revised by Rothe (see M ullins and Rothe
2008; Rothe and M ullins 2006; Rothe 2006; Rothe and M ullins 2011). R othe’s (2006)
integrated theory o f state crime follows in the footsteps o f Kram er and M ichalow ski’s
(1990) original theory o f state-corporate crime by incorporating several types o f
criminological theories, including disorganization, control, anomie, and deterrence, as
well as organizational theories, into an integrated theory. Rothe (2006) departs from
Kramer and M ichalowski (1990) and Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) in two significant
ways. First, she adds an additional catalyst: constraints. Constraints are roadblocks or
obstacles to deviance that must be circum navigated for the acts to occur. Second, Rothe
(2006) continues to utilize the original levels o f analysis (m acro/structural,
meso/organizational, and micro levels), but also adds a fourth, the international level, to
obtain a holistic understanding o f the acts and the intricate nature o f such crimes. In the
integrated theory o f state crime, the international is separate and distinct from the macro
because the factors working at the macro domestic and macro international levels may be
very different and im pact the com mission o f deviance in very different m anners (see
Figure 2 for a full detail o f the theoretical ideologies interwoven into the integrated
theory o f state crime). The integrated theory o f state crime has been used often by
critical criminologists to explain state deviance and crim inality (e.g., M ullins 2009; Rothe
and M ullins 2006; Rothe 2009a)
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This work seeks to clarify a specific com ponent o f the integrated theory o f state
crime by explicating the variable o f realpolitik. 1 propose that the variable realpolitik be
added to the model as a motivation. Rothe (2009b) already includes the concept under
the term inology “political, econom ic, ideological interests/resources” in motivations.
Rem em ber that realpolitik is based on three theoretical components: military, political,
and econom ic interests that states seek to protect above all else. By clarifying that these
are actually realpolitik, we may bridge the crim inological and international relations
bodies o f literature for a deeper understanding o f these com plex international
m echanism s in action.
It is not only the theoretical com ponent noted above that is central to this work.
The dotted boxes in Figure 2 indicate the specific parts o f the theory that are applicable.
R othe’s (2009b) theory is strong on integration o f crim inology and other disciplines,
which is required to study a phenom enon as com plex as this work attempts. The
following sections will draw out the theories implicit in the integrated theory o f state
crime that are relevant in explaining intervention decision-m aking by the P5.

D iffusion o f Responsibility
This com ponent draws from organizational theories and is applied in the integrated
theory o f state crim e at the organizational level (Rothe 2009b). Organizational theories
have been used in the study o f white-collar crime to explain that the organization, itself,
may actually promote crim inality (Kauzlarich and K ramer 1998). This body o f theories
has also drawn upon crim inological theories to understand organization behavior,
specifically anom ie (M erton 1949). Kauzlarich and K ramer (1998:145) explain that:
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Figure 2. R othe’s (2009b: 112) Integrated Theory o f State C rim e’s Causal Logic Model
with Integrated Theory Variables.
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[o rg an izatio n s...are extremely goal oriented and concerned with perform ance,
while norms governing the mean to achieve these goals may be weak or absent.
Thus, legitim ate means to achieve goals may be unavailable or blocked in some
way. The em phasis on goal attainment, com bined with blocked legitimate means,
may induce “strain” and compel organizations to “innovate” and use illegitim ate
means to achieve their goals.
In this way, organizations may seek to fill operational goals in ways that may include
crim inality in order to achieve success.
One factor that perm its the use o f illegitim ate means by organizations is the
diffusion o f responsibility. Feldman and Rosen (1978) define the term in this way:
[bjasically, group m em bers share in the culpability for the negative outcom es o f
the group's actions, w hereas persons acting alone have sole responsibility for the
negative outcom es o f their actions. Hence, the single individual, acting by •
himself, feels a greater degree o f individual responsibility than do the group
members.
This is applicable to the work at hand because all o f the decision-m aking in this dataset
occurred in groups. The group dynam ic o f the United N ations and the UNSC may perm it
members to vote in w ays that may seem acceptable when executed in a group situation
but may not be as morally or socially acceptable if sim ilar decisions w ere made w ithout
the group dynamic. This diffusion o f responsibility, w here the level o f responsibility in a
group dynamic is less than the level o f responsibility for sole decision-m aking, is o f
critical importance to this work. Although individual decisions are published and
member states may be held responsible for those individual voting decisions, the decision
to intervene or in what manners to intervene are decided by overall group votes. This
may permit voters to feel less responsible for actions taken by the group or mitigate their
own self-interests based on the group dynamic.

D efinition o f the Situation
The definition o f the situation variable in Rothe’s (2009b) model is also at the
center o f this work. Perinbanayagam (1974:523) explains:
there are two dim ensions to human conduct— one a series o f responses to
objective situations and another to a series o f responses to meanings. Such a
distinction between objects and meanings is an untenable and indefensible one in
term s o f human conduct.
Thus, the definition o f the situation includes not only the literal facts o f the situation but
the m anner in which individuals interpret a situation. Perinbanayagam (1974) writes in
terms o f individuals, but this idea may be extrapolated into group dynam ics as well. In a
group, individuals gather and define the situation based on literal facts and a compilation
o f individual interpretations, resulting in a collective definition o f the situation. The key
here is the gap between reality and perception o f the situation (Perinbanayagam 1974)
and the m anner in w hich both individuals and groups join the two to ultimately define it.
This project focuses on the definition o f the situation and how that label dictates
the interventions available. This theoretical com ponent will be relied upon heavily in the
analysis. The objective definition o f the situation as opposed to the perception o f it is
critical to understanding the labeling o f the conflict in Darfur. Realpolitik is
hypothesized to impact the subjective definitional process at the international level, and
in the case o f Darfur particularly.

Strain
Strain is the result o f desiring goals that one does not have the means to achieve
(Agnew 1987; M erton 1949; M essner and Rosenfeld 2001). It was originally theorized
by Robert M erton (1949) who described strain as resulting from the inordinate focus on
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financial accumulation and visible signs o f success in US culture that leaves many
Americans desiring the trappings o f success but lacking the m echanism s in which to
obtain such items legitimately. Deviance may result when individuals utilize other means
to achieve desires, including criminal behavior. M erton (1949) applied these ideas at the
individual level, where he identified four types o f adaptations to strain, as well as at the
societal, macro-level to explain rates o f crim inality in the US. W hen discussing strain at
the macro-level, he identified social structure as a m ajor com ponent o f strain, which may
be seen in the vast disparities between socioeconomic statuses that still exists in US
society to date.
M erton’s (1949) strain theory was later adapted into general strain theory by
Robert Agnew (1987; 1992), but Agnew ignored the social structure. Ignoring the social
structure removes much o f the explanatory pow er o f strain at the international level.
Although M erton (1949) focused on the United States and the desire for capital
accumulation that has led to social structural im balances that cause strain, his theory may
be applied at the international level as well. There are many instances in w hich a state
may have desires that may be unobtainable through legitimate means and deviance may
result. The goals/desires/wants versus means problem for states may be sim ply a
problem o f com peting interests. An understanding o f these com peting interests is crucial.

International Relations Theory
Rothe (2009b) includes international relations theories implicitly in her model and
I seek to draw this out. The two international relations theories that are applicable here
are realism/neorealism and realpolitik. Each will be reviewed in turn.
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Realism a n d Neorealism. The central concept o f the realism school, now known
as the neorealism school, is “motivation by pragmatic self-interest” (Hutchings 1999:15).
The realism school is often traced to Thucydides and his writings o f the Peloponnesian
War in the early 400s B.C. (W ayman and Diehl 1994). It is M achiavelli, however, who
is cited as one o f the earliest and most prom inent realist scholars. He wrote o f the social
contract obligor and state ruler as a “prince” (M achiavelli [1532] 1979). Yet, this prince
is no benevolent figure; he is “a great hypocrite and a liar” (M achiavelli [1532]
1979:134) who should make every effort to be a good steward but “should know how to
enter into evil when necessity com m ands” (M achiavelli [1532] 1979:135). M achiavelli
([1532] 1979) explains that a prince should maintain appearances o f proper and ju st
behavior but execute his duties as he personally sees fit. The prince should seek to make
his kingdom fear rather than hate him, and do w hatever necessary to m aintain the
kingdom and its sovereignty. A lack o f m orality and deceit are hallmarks o f the prince he
describes, one who does whatever necessary to obtain goals and prosperity.
This lack o f accountability on the part o f those in power is important because
realism insists that foreign policy is guided by a desire for greater wealth accumulation
and power rather than moral interests (Bjola 2009) and rests on the state sovereignty
established in the Treaty o f W estphalia (1648). Further, the entanglem ent o f morality
into foreign policy only makes such decisions com plex and ambiguous (Bjola 2009).
Realist scholars proscribe to a moral relativism in which m orality is pertinent in some,
but certainly not all, aspects o f governance (Bjola 2009). Legitimacy and m orality are
mutually exclusive. M orgenthau (Bjola 2009; Yunus 2003), however, theorizes a moral
com ponent in foreign relations in a survival-of-the-fittest typology (see also Kissinger

36

1977); morality has a place in foreign relations when it is used to ensure continued
existence o f the state (Bjola 2009). After all. “ [mjorality without security is ineffectual;
security without morality is empty. To establish the relationship and proportion between
these goals is perhaps the most profound challenge before our government and our
nation” (Kissinger 1977:66).
Hobbes, alternately, specifically denounces the idea o f security in the
international arena. Rather, the Hobbesian theory o f international relations centers
around his definition o f the state o f nature as one o f constant turm oil (W illiam s 2006) or
“bellum omnium contra onmes...lhe state o f nature = international relations = the war o f
all against all” (W ight 2005:144-5). Due to this unending threat, states m ust remain in a
constant readiness to prepare against attack, and self-defense m ust be a top priority for
any state (Bjola 2009). In fact:
[the Hobbesian] state o f nature derives from precisely the lack o f any such
com m onality...individuals construct their own realities, their ow n understanding
o f what is good and bad, desirable and undesirable, threatening and unthreatening,
and act on the basis on these beliefs. Lacking agreement on what the world is, as
well as over what it ought to be, the state o f nature is anarchic in a sense far
deeper than that captured by...rationalist thinkers... The state o f nature is defined
not just by a lack o f trust, but much more fundamentally by a condition o f
epistemological indeterminacy which renders even the universal fear o f death at
best a partial remedy, and the existence o f conflict and mistrust endemic
(emphasis in original). (W illiam s 2006:256-7)
This mistrust may be evidenced in the m ilitary build-up o f states, especially in
industrialized nations. The proliferation o f nuclear arms is an exam ple o f the constant
state o f readiness required for self-protection o f states, as is the possession but secrecy
surrounding the type or numbers o f such weapons. Hobbes makes clear that states cannot
and should not trust each other because the individualized interests possessed by each
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state make true allies difficult to find; states m ust be prepared to defend against friend or
foe at any time.
Lack o f trust between states at the international level has existed since states
began forming. Hutchings (1999:16) explains that this is consistent with realism as “the
forces o f ought and is push and pull against each other in a perpetual tug o f war, but they
do not combine, either in terms o f synthesis or in terms o f one subsum ing the other.”
Further:
[m jodem political realism takes on board two o f H obbes’s [sic] most important
argum ents.. .the notion o f order as a central political value which is the effective
presupposition o f right... [and] the idea o f a strict distinction between state and
inter-state politics in general...the norm s governing politics in general (domestic
and international) tend to be derived from the fundamental interest in security.
(Hutchings 1999:19)
International political realism differentiates between the ideologies o f right versus might;
states may see certain behaviors or interventions as the right or moral course o f action.
However, states may refuse to com m it to such because they may be inconsistent with the
opposing, but equally strong, desire for protection o f self-interest and security at all costs.
It is this duality o f roles that ushered in the neorealist school o f thought.
The neorealist school o f politics places domestic and international politics into
separate spheres (Hutchings 1999). Kenneth W altz, the most prom inent neorealist,
explains “ [t]he conception o f the international is, in line with political realism, one which
stresses the international as being fundamentally anarchic, lacking a principle o f order”
(Hutchings 1999:20). Neorealism may be summarized in this manner: “ [internationally,
states operate in a context o f anarchy which dictates certain kinds o f priorities and
behaviors and a single conception o f the good for all states, that is, to ensure international
order and a relative advantage within it” (H utchings 1999:20). It is clear that the realist
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and neorealist schools are related but differ in that the neorealist school moves away from
the duality o f right versus might. The focus o f the neorealist school is state-centered
individualized interests in relation to international politics, which is often described as
realpolitik.

Realpolitik. Realpolitik was coined by August Ludwig von R ochau’s (1972
[1853]) Grundsatze der Realpolitik, Angew endet a u f die Staatlichen Zustande
D eutschlands (Principles o f Realpolitik, A pplied to the State Circumstances in Germany)
and is simply defined as a state’s own self-interest: “nation-states pursue their own
national interests and conceive these national interests primarily in terms o f power”
(W ayman and Diehl 1994:5). The concept is generally considered to involve three
components: political interests, military interests, and economic interests (Bassiouni
2008; Rothe 2010; W aym an and Diehl 1994). Realpolitik plays a m ajor role in foreign
policymaking. Yunus (2003:166) explains the idea well:
M orgenthau gives his vision o f world politics as, ‘all nations, our own included,
as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in term s o f
pow er... we are (then) able to judge other nations as we judge our own and,
having judged them in this fashion, we are then capable o f pursuing policies that
respect the interest o f other nations, while protecting and prom oting those o f our
own. M oderation in policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation o f political
judgm ent.
The central issue here is that the state’s own interests come before those o f others.
Gum plowicz (as cited in Aho 1975:49) explains, “the social structure is no longer
founded upon blood relations but upon domination relations.” Gumplowicz wrote o f the
blood relations o f kinship, but this may also be extrapolated to the blood relations and
interconnectedness o f hum ankind in today’s global village. His statement still rings true
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in this fresh definitional application, as imperialism and realpolitik may be perceived as
superseding the protection o f basic human rights.
Cohen (1975) explains realpolitik as a cost versus benefit analysis where pow er is
the central goal and the security o f a nation is a direct result o f the am ount o f pow er held.
He describes realpolitik’s propositions as follows:
[t]he security o f a state will be most readily enhanced if it follows policies which
will ultimately result in increases in its own pow er or decreases or at least no
increases in its opponent’s power ...pow er is o f the essence... states must
constantly seek to increase their power relative to actual or potential
opponents.. .the policies o f a state, which are the ways in which the pow er o f a
state is exercised, must be properly designed to gain the desired goals...[and] a
proper policy will maximize gains o f pow er and security while m inim izing costs
and risks. (Cohen 1975:172).
Further, he states em phatically that, “ [o]nly by the practice o f realpolitik can a state
become secure or remain secure” (Cohen 1975:173). Also, states em ploying realpolitik
“are skeptical o f international law, o f the United Nations, and o f any ideals... that attem pt
to transcend or replace nationalism ” (W ayman and Diehl 1994:5). In these term s, state
power and security transcend all else.
W ayman and Diehl (1994) add the concept o f strategy to their realpolitik
definition. Because “security is a function o f pow er and pow er is a function o f m ilitary
capabilities” (Kegley and Raymond 1994:187), realpolitik may be considered on a
continuum ranging from the most strategic to the least strategic decisions in relation to
national interests (Kegley and Raymond 1994). Further, Kegley and Raymond
(1994:207) classify humanitarian intervention as the “ least strategic” o f all state
decisions. For the current work, however, realpolitik must be analyzed from a
criminological perspective.
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In sum, it is the integration o f crim inological, organizational, and international
relations theories that provide the strongest theoretical foundation in which to frame this
study. This is done through the use o f the integrated theory o f state crime. Because these
research questions are geared tow ard a com prehensive understanding o f a com plex topic,
a qualitative analysis is the most appropriate method. It will provide the reader with a
holistic and detailed understanding o f how and why realpolitik may or may not influence
Darfur intervention decisions by the UNSC. The methods are outlined in the section that
follows.
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CHAPTER IV
M ETHODS

An integrated methodological approach will be employed, including a conflict
narrative and a qualitative analysis. A brief description o f the conflict in Darfur will be
provided. Then, a case study will detail a timeline and description o f interventions
applied to the conflict in Darfur by the UN and its m ember bodies. A qualitative analysis
will follow seeking to understand why such interventions were selected, as well as if
realpolitik may have played a role in UN and UNSC intervention decisions. The
intervention case study and the analysis will center on the UN and UNSC decisions.
In an effort to explain this decision-making process by the P5, the qualitative case
study method will be used. This work seeks to determine if the P5 individually and
collectively as the UNSC circumvented forceful intervention as authorized and mandated
by the Genocide Convention and, if so, what justifications were used to do such. These
questions are a perfect match to a qualitative case study approach because, as Yin
(2003:13) explains, “ [a] case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenom enon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Case studies are heuristic
(M erriam 1988), inductive (Greene 2007; M erriam 1988; Stake 2000; Yin 2003), holistic
(M erriam 1988; Stake 2000), and permit the emergence o f new or unknown variables or
interactions (M erriam 1988). It is this ability to let the previously unknown em erge that
makes the case study the most appropriate method for this work.
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To date, the conflict in Darfur has not been studied in a manner that allow s the
themes related to avoidance o f effective interventions to emerge and permit an
understanding o f both how and why thus-far inadequate interventions have been chosen.
M any have undertaken the study o f the factors related to the violence and the causation;
however, taking a different approach and focusing on the decision-m aking process o f the
U N SC ’s Permanent Five individually and collectively will allow for a more holistic and
com plete understanding o f the conflict response.
A case study o f the interventions applied aims to bring to light the associated
political processes involved in such decisions at both the P5 state and international levels.
From domestic docum ents detailing P5 discussions, hearings, and investigations related
to Darfur, as well as UNSC hearings and resolutions, the analysis will focus on the actual
text, along with the associated contextual and latent meanings o f the words used and
labels applied to the conflict throughout these docum ents. By placing the labels and
discussions related to the conflict in context with the intervention decisions, I seek to
deconstruct the discourse related to the conflict. I aim to contextualize the social,
political, economic, and militaristic influences on the conflict term inology and resultant
intervention decisions by the P5 and UNSC. Through application o f the integrated theory
o f state crime, 1 seek to determ ine the possible influence o f realpolitik in this decision
making process.
Analysis o f this discourse will begin with triangulation o f the obtained data
through multiple sources to ensure validity. Next, the data will be arranged
chronologically to permit a thorough understanding o f the docum entation, discussions,
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and reports from the origination o f the conflict and the initial mention o f Darfur
discussions and UNSC m eetings from 2002 to the mid-2012.
Once arranged chronologically, each docum ent will be read individually for
themes related to the discourse o f the conflict. Because the case study m ethod will be
used, unexpected patterns and them es may emerge. The analysis will be sensitive to
such. The variable under study is realpolitik and its potential influence on use o f force
decisions perm itted in cases o f genocide in accordance with the Genocide Convention.
Data will be analyzed for discourse related to decision-making behavior o f the P5
individually and collectively as the UNSC.

DATA
The prim ary and secondary data used in this work will come from a variety o f
sources. The primary data are derived from two sources: (1) domestic reports generated
by the five states holding perm anent seats on the UNSC, including investigations into the
situation in Darfur, hearings, and statements, and (2) intergovernmental reports generated
by the United Nations and its Security Council, including mission reports, UNSC
presidential docum ents, UNSC meeting docum ents, UNSC resolutions, and UN
Secretary-General docum ents, statements, and press releases related to Darfur. Domestic
investigations and reports com piled by the United States will be obtained through the
Congressional and White House official websites. Chinese reports will be gathered from
the M inistry o f Foreign Affairs website. French documents are available through the
websites o f its Senate and National Assembly. The Russian Federation (RF) also
provides access to public docum ents on the website o f its M inistry o f Foreign Affairs.
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Reports from the United Kingdom o f Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are
available on the website o f their Parliament. United Nations docum entation will be
obtained from the public domain official website and archives o f the United N ations and
its Library o f Documents. The conflict in Darfur was a much-discussed topic by the
United Nations, as evidenced by the total o f 3,939 docum ents referencing the issue
between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 2012.
The United Nations offers a trem endous am ount o f docum entation o f meetings
and actions on its website. The United N ations Bibliographic Information System
(UNBISNET) houses docum ents related to voting, speeches, and bibliographic data. The
United Nation Official Document System (UNODS) is a more general docum entation
service which “covers all types o f official United Nations docum entation, beginning in
1993... including access to the resolutions o f the General Assem bly, Security Council,
Economic and Social Council, and Trusteeship Council from 1946 onw ards” (United
Nations 2012b). Finally, UN press releases are housed in a separate database.
An Internet search o f the UNODS found approxim ately 31,800 docum ents with
the words “ Sudan” or “D arfur” within them from 2002 to 2012. W hen only those
docum ents in English were specified, approxim ately 15,879 docum ents dated between
January 1, 2002, and June 30, 2012. M any o f the mentions o f the word “ Sudan” without
“Darfur” were in relation to the hostilities and subsequent secession o f South Sudan as
well as other matters pertinent to the state o f Sudan but not directly related to the conflict
occurring in Darfur. Because this work focuses solely on the conflict in Darfur, the
docum ents with “Sudan” but not “Darfur” in them were elim inated from the analysis.
When searching for only “Darfur” in the docum ents, 3,588 docum ents were returned
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from UNODS. The press release database yielded 281 documents. UBNISNET held 20
voting records, 299 speech records, and 1,032 bibliographic documents. Therefore the
total number o f docum ents from the UN docum ent services totaled 5,220. After
com bining the docum ents into a single list, many duplicates were identified. Once
removed, 3,939 docum ents containing the word “ Darfur” were identified.
Each docum ent was read to determine content. Some o f the docum ents discuss
D arfur in term s o f w ater quality or other peripheral issues unrelated to the conflict or the
interventions applied by the United Nations. M any o f these docum ents were various UN
m ember state representatives speaking o f concerns about the conflict but had no direct
relation. These docum ents were also removed from the analysis. Once the non-relevant
docum ents were removed, a total o f 2,380 docum ents referencing D arfur remained. O f
those 2,380 docum ents related to the conflict in Darfur, only 390 contained discussions o f
the conflict relevant to this work. Along with these prim ary sources, secondary data will
also be used.
Secondary data was used to triangulate inform ation obtained in primary sources,
as well as to provide context to the primary source data. Secondary data was drawn from
multiple sources, including reports and press releases issued by intergovernmental
organizations such the African Union and the European Union, as well as
nongovernmental organizations such as the International Com m ittee o f the Red Cross,
A mnesty International and Human Rights Watch. These reports and docum ents were
accessed through the public domain websites o f each organization. Books written on the
conflict were also used (e.g., Cockett 2010; Flint and de Waal 2008; Jok 2007; Prunier
2005). There were also hundreds o f reports related to Darfur available from newspaper
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and other media outlets. Secondary data was verified by triangulating prim ary data with
at least two secondary sources to ensure the validity o f the data obtained.

LIM ITATIONS
A major and commonly cited limitation o f the case study method is a lack o f
generalizability that may exist due to the use o f a single case (M erriam 1988; Stake
2000). Other problem s involved in case study research may involve reliability and
validity (M erriam 1988). These issues rest on the ability to replicate findings, or lack
thereof, due to use o f a single case, as well as each researcher’s ability to execute the
study w ithout bias. After all, each individual harbors biases, conscious or unconscious,
that impact research, from the choosing o f an area o f research to the approach taken to
undertake such and the variables chosen for the analysis. These lim itations may be
m itigated in the use o f triangulation o f multiple sources to validate data obtained
(M erriam 1988; Silverman 2005; Stake 2000; Yin 2003).
There are other limitations to this work due to the nature o f the phenom enon
under study. One o f the most glaring limitations is the availability o f data. Research o f a
highly politicized and sensitive topic involves some insurmountable issues, such as
confidential meetings, confidential or unreleased docum ents, undocum ented meetings
held behind closed doors, redacted docum entation, and classification o f docum ents that
prevents release to the public. The United States government, as well as the governm ents
o f the other four permanent members o f the UNSC, uses discretion in permitting access
or publication o f documents, hearings, and decisions regarding relations with other
countries. The largest obstacle in this research is the inability to obtain all o f the
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docum ents that pertain to the decision-making process o f m em ber states o f the UNSC in
regards to the labeling o f and response to the events in Darfur. The only way in which to
mitigate this limitation is to obtain every relevant docum ent available to create the m ost
complete depiction possible o f the actual discussions and m eetings related to Darfur.
Another issue is accessibility to data. The data released by states in relation to
discussions or decisions related to other countries, may be biased or politically sanitized.
As detailed above, states will not create docum ents for all m eetings in relation to other
countries, and may not release docum ents that are created. Therefore, researchers must
question the validity and integrity o f the available docum ents. The docum ents and data
that are available may not elicit a full and unbiased understanding o f the situation, as
states may find it in their own interest to remain politically correct. W hen the released
docum ents are analyzed, they m ust be done so with the understanding that the docum ents
may not fully explicate the unbiased position o f the state.
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CHAPTER V
DARFURI CONFLICT NARRATIVE

Although this w ork focuses on the labeling and discourse applied to the Darfuri
conflict by international institutions o f social control, understanding the conflict is
important to such an analysis. A t its roots, I suggest that the conflict is politically based.
M oreover, these political differences were socially constructed to exacerbate divisiveness
where little had existed historically.

SUDAN
Today, Sudan is home to “A frica’s longest running civil w ar” (Cockett 2010:159).
It lies directly west o f the Horn o f Africa and is a large and vibrant country o f
approxim ately 40 m illion citizens (e.g., Cockett 2010; Flint and de Waal 2008; Jok 2007;
Prunier 2005). Sudan was colonized by the British in 1899 and it is here that the
dangerous division between the regions o f Sudan as a political construct began. Cockett
(2010:31) details that:
[t]he British were, essentially, only interested in the riverain centre. The two
other parts o f what they handed on as ‘Sudan’ [at Sudanese independence] in
1956 were only late additions. Darfur, as big as France, home to the nonArabized, M uslim tribes such as the Zaghawa and Fur, was only vaguely joined to
the lands ruled from Khartoum when the British conquered it in 1916. South
Sudan, formerly known as Equatoria, entirely different in every conceivable way,
geographically, religiously and ethnically, was admitted as an alm ost com pletely
separate country by the British and only grafted onto ‘Sudan’ a few years before
the end o f colonial rule.
Colonialism is at the root o f some o f problem s that will later erupt into violence in Sudan.
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The Darfur area o f Sudan has been traditionally home to many tribes. Dar means
“tribal homeland" (Cockett 2010) or “country” (Prunier 2005) in Arabic, so Darfur
translates as homeland or country o f the Fur, one o f the m ajor tribes living in the area.
Others include the M asalit and the Zaghawa. The areas inhabited by the tribes are
identified as Dar M asalit or Dar Zaghawa-, however, the entire western region o f the
Sudan has come to be called Darfur despite the fact that the region is home to many more
than the Fur. Thus, when discussing the region o f Darfur, it is im portant to rem em ber
that the term is not used in the strictest sense (Dar Fur) but, rather, references the
w esternmost region o f Sudan that has come to be collectively identified as such and
encompasses three states: North Darfur, South Darfur, and W estern Darfur.
This amalgam ation o f regions under a single state is a one m ajor reason
underlying both the secession o f South Sudan (now the independent Republic o f South
Sudan as o f July 2011) and the twenty-plus years o f conflict in Darfur. However, this
was not the only social structural concern remaining when Sudan finally gained
independence in 1956. A second British remnant is also a m ajor factor in both conflicts:
the focus on Khartoum, capital o f Sudan, at the expense o f the other regions.
When colonized by the British, Sudan continued to run under a tribal
adm inistration system similar to the way in which it had been functioning (M ullins and
Rothe 2008:168). The British did not seek to make major changes in the way that the
government ran other than to begin to accumulate resources in the capital o f Khartoum.
This concentration o f economic, political, educational, health care, and other resources
left the remainder o f the country suffering from deprivation and neglect (M ullins and
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). In fact, more than h alf o f all state “income and assets”
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(Prunier 2005:25) remained in and around Khartoum (Cockett 2010:30). Very few
resources eventually made it to D arfur (M ullins and Rothe 2008). Khartoum has
historically been, and continues to be, the center o f cultural and economic life o f the
country. Cockett (2010:19) explains:
[t]his paradox o f Khartoum, o f a core o f w ealth and optim ism surrounded by rings
o f extrem e poverty, injustice and political exclusion, is also the paradox o f
S udan...its post-independence sto ry ...can seem like nothing more than a long
series o f armed struggles between the centre o f the country and the peripheries Darfur, the south and east - as people fight to claim what they feel is theirs from a
self-absorbed ruling elite in Khartoum.
Additionally, the oil that undergirds much o f Sudan’s econom y com es from regions near
the center o f the country but is pumped north towards Khartoum, where the profits stay
(Cockett 2010). Sudan’s economy is heavily reliant on this oil production, with over half
o f government revenues and alm ost 95% o f exports stemming from the resource (Cockett
2010). M eanwhile, the men and women who live above the oil reserves gain no benefit
from the resources right below their feet (Cockett 2010). This is but one exam ple o f the
focus on Khartoum at the expense o f other regions o f the country. Prunier (2005) calls
this “benign neglect,” while Cockett (2010:32) explains that the British “purposefully
underdeveloped Darfur in order to keep it under control.”

Drought, Desertification, and Famine
A nother m ajor contributing factor to the violence is the extreme environmental
conditions that have plagued Sudan, and specifically Darfur, over the past few decades
(Cockett 2010; M ullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). There were a series o f droughts
and associated famine throughout the 1980s (Cockett 2010; M ullins and Rothe 2008),
which led to the death, and displacement o f hundreds o f thousands (Cockett 2010;
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M ullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005); almost 100,000 Darfuri had starved to death by
the mid-1980s (Cockett 2010). Darfuri interviewed by Cockett (2010) discussed at least
seventeen droughts between the 1970s and 2004, with the most severe in 1984-1985,
1991, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004.
The changing environmental conditions are very im portant as they led tribes to
alter their means o f survival to com bat the degradation.
The Arab pastoralists normally moved from south to north to follow the rain, but
from 1990 onwards, because o f the lack o f rainfall and the subsequent shortage o f
grass, they would cut short the time they spent in the north from seven months to
ju st two or three. Instead, they started encroaching on the more fertile areas in the
centre and south o f Darfur, particularly around the Jebel Marra, the m ountainous
heart o f D arfur... This area was m ainly populated by the African Fur, M asalit and
other tribes. Thus, the Arab nomads began attacking the settled farmers to claim a
share o f the available w ater and grazing land. (Cockett 2010:172)
These encroachments had typically been handled locally and the groups successfully
resolved such conflicts in that m anner for decades. However, as the political climate o f
Sudan began to em phasize the differences in the tribes, such conflicts became more
difficult to resolve locally through longstanding traditional tribal m echanism s (Cockett
2010). Additionally, M ullins and Rothe (2008:170) warn that, “ [t]he focus on
desertification assumes that this is a natural and uncontrollable process.” Although the
environm ent played a m ajor role, the conflict cannot be explained simply in term s o f
environmental degradation and changing sustainability patterns o f tribes. These factors
were cum ulative to the use o f ethnic labels and divisive political rhetoric, as well as the
heightened attention to such.
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DIVISIVE POLITICAL DISCOURSE
Although the tribes living in Darfuri states had coexisted peacefully for centuries,
with traditional ways o f resolving conflicts, much o f the literature on the conflict focuses
on the more recent history o f the tribes pitted against one another. It is vital to note that
these tribes did not readily identify them selves as Arab or African, nor were these labels
needed or im portant (M ullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). They sim ply lived their
lives as they had for centuries and had little conflict am ongst the groups.
This changed when politicians began to construct distrust and fear between the
groups in order to further their own political desires (M ullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier
2005). One point at w hich this is readily seen is when the Constitutional Com m ittee was
formed in 1965, where politicians proposed three different ideologies. South Sudan
desired a constitution based on secular ideology, the Islamic Charter Front pushed for a
fully Islamic constitution, and the Unionists wanted a constitution based in Islam
(M ullins and Rothe 2008). It is here that the first “A rab” versus “A frican” split began to
form, whereby A rabs were socially constructed as the “ruling elite” (M ullins and Rothe
2008:170)— consistent with the majority Arab Khartoum that remained at the center o f
politics and modernization in Sudan.
A few years later, this “Arab ruling elite” would gain greater mom entum . The
tribes o f D arfur were traditionally M adhist and their political party was the Umma
(Cockett 2010; M ullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). The Umma never gained
political power in Sudan, leaving Darfur further politically neglected and unrepresented
(Cockett 2010; M ullins and Rothe 2008). In the late 1960s, a split in the Um m a party left
two m ajor political players: Sadiq al-M ahdi and his uncle Imam al-Hadi (M ullins and

Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). While campaigning during the 1968 election. al-M adhi
sought support from the “African” tribes while al-Hadi courted the “A rabs” (M ullins and
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). This split was exacerbated by the accom panying political
rhetoric, which built upon the Khartoum-centric frustrations o f the African tribes and
made it appear that the Arabs themselves were the root o f the problem (M ullins and
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). The “ Fur, M asalit, and Zaghawa eagerly accepted this belief,
given that historically their presence and representation was absent from the power center
o f Khartoum” (M ullins and Rothe 2008:170). This political ideology brought decades o f
resource deprivation and neglect frustrations to the surface and gave it a face: an Arab
face.
Soon after this political chasm began to form, Libya’s Ghadaffi attempted to take
Darfur as part o f Libya in the 1970s. This invasion further intensified the precarious
“Arab nomadic tribes” versus “Fur settled farmers” divide in Darfur, as well as filled the
area with arms (Cockett 2010:46). In fact, leaders o f the Justice and Equality M ovement
(JEM ) labeled G hadaffi’s plan as the “Arabization” or “ Islam ization” o f D arfur (Cockett
2010). “It was this Arabization o f the struggle... that brought the taint o f racism and
ethnic cleansing that would shape the conflict from the late 1990s onwards, leading many
to characterize it later as ‘genocide’” (Cockett 2010:175). Further, Prunier (2005:46)
describes that the:
rough handling o f D arfur by the Libyans, the Chadians, and Khartoum forces
decisively worsened the regional ethno-political landscape. Tribes that had seen
themselves prim arily in local term s were suddenly catapulted into a broader
artificial world where they were summoned to declare themselves as either
“A rab” or zurga. The “A rabs” were “progressive” or “revolutionary” , while the
“A fricans” were “anti-Arab” and “reactionary” .
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The political split between Arabs and Africans, where none had existed before, is what
many journalists have identified as the root o f the conflict. This is how the conflict was
labeled an ethnic conflict while neglecting all other contributing factors such as resource
deprivation and desertification as discussed above. This com plex conflict cannot be
reduced to such simple explanations. In fact, Cockett (2010:174) explains that the
leaders o f the rebels groups in D arfur told him it was “prim arily a political war.”

REBEL GROUPS STRIKE
When the Darfuri frustrations reached a boiling point, several groups formed to
address the inequality in the social structure, or to simply strike back at their oppressors.
The two major rebel groups, the Justice and Equality M ovem ent (JEM ) and the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA), are m ost often linked to these causes. The JEM is a Zaghaw a
rebel group (Prunier 2005), who published a “Black Book” in 2002 circulated in
Khartoum, listing many o f the problems that the Darfuri had with the governm ent and
Khartoum (Cockett 2010). This became the manifesto o f the movement. The JEM
w asn’t focused on Darfur solely, but, rather, desired larger social change that would
enable more social equality (Cockett 2010). Alternately, the Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA) was focused on D arfur and sought more political equality and representation in
Khartoum (Cockett 2010). The JEM had a larger, macro-level list o f concerns whereby
the SLA simply wanted more for Darfur, which their demands narrowly focused upon
(Cockett 2010).
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Both groups were implicated in the attack identified as the impetus to the increase
in violence that led the Government o f Sudan (GoS) to arm m ilitias to address the rebel
groups.
[0 ]n 26 February a group o f about 300 men supported by thirty “technicals”
attacked the small town o f Golu, killing nearly 200 soldiers...w ord “insurrection”
used for first tim e .. .D arfur was not simply armed looting or an action o f roadcutter, as the governm ent alleg ed ...a certain “acceptable” level o f violence in the
W estern province had been routine, and nobody was very w orried by “norm al”
killings. But 300 men and their technical— this was a level o f organization which
was new. (Prunier 2005:93)
After the attack, the GoS gave the perpetrators ten days to surrender, prom ising a m ilitary
solution within 24 hours if surrender did not occur (Prunier 2005). Once that deadline
had passed, the low-intensity violence that had occurred in Darfur for years intensified
greatly (Prunier 2005). In Darfur, violence had always been followed by negotiations o f
peace, which was always later followed by more violence leading to further peace
negotiations. This vicious circle continued for decades until this attack in February 2003,
which became the point o f no return in the conflict (M ullins and Rothe 2008).

JANJAW EED
The Janjaweed is a militia group that has existed in Sudan since the 1980s
(M ullins and Rothe 2008). Janjaw eed com es from the Arabic jin n meaning “spirit” and
ja w a d meaning “horse” and may be “roughly translated into ‘ghostly riders’ or ‘evil
horsem en’” (Prunier 2005:xv). The vast majority o f the literature on the conflict in
Darfur, however, com m only defines the word as translating into “devil on horseback.”
Despite these definitional variations, all agree that this Arab m ilitia rides in on horses and
maims, burns, rapes, and kills the things and people in its path.
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The Janjaweed are a vital part o f the conflict narrative because they have been
funded, armed, and supported by the GoS (Cockett 2010; de Waal 2007; M ullins and
Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). “ [T]hese rough armed bands had existed since the late 1980s
in an undeterminate [sic] zone half-way between being bandits and governm ent thugs”
(Prunier 2005:97). However, they were promoted to government henchm en when
President al-B ashir’s Special Task Force on Darfur solidified the relationship between the
government and the Janjaweed. This relationship is evidenced by the Sudanese military
uniforms, including rank emblems, provided to the Janjaweed (Cockett 2010; Flint and de
Waal 2008; M ullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005). The Government o f Sudan denied
such an alliance but the evidence was undeniable.
In Sudan, “the word “Ja n ja w eed ’ first appeared in September o f [2003] when the
attack on the small town o f Jebel M arra was reported” (Prunier 2005). Around the same
time, Dr. M ukesh Kapila, UN C hief in Sudan, met with a m em ber o f al-B ashir’s
adm inistration in September 2003, where he was told that the President wanted “a final
solution in Darfur” (Cockett 2010:170). Prunier (2005:100) describes the brutal tactics
utilized by these government-sanctioned killers:
[a]fter the A ntonov’s [Russian planes] had finished their grisly jo b [dropping
crude bombs], com bat helicopters and/or MiG fighter-bombers would come,
machine-gunning and firing rockets at any large targets such as a school or a
warehouse which might still be standing. Utter destruction was clearly
programmed. When the air attacks were over, the Janjaw eed would arrive, either
by themselves or in the company o f regular Army units. The militiam en would be
mounted on horses and cam els and often be accompanied by others riding in
“technicals”. They would surround the village and what followed would vary. In
the “hard” pattern they would cordon o ff the place, loot personal belongings, rape
the girls and women, steal the cattle and kill the donkeys. Then they would bum
the houses and shoot all those who could not run away. Small children, being
light, were often tossed back in the burning houses. In the “soft” pattern, the
militiam en would beat up people, loot, shoot a few recalcitrant men, rape the
females, often scarring them or branding them with a hot iron so that they would

57

become recognizable as “spoilt” women in the future. It is during these “soft”
attacks that the insults were hurled at the villagers and the references were made
to their “African” origins which, said the Janjaweed, justified their fate as they
were “zurga [black]” and the land “now belonged to the Arabs” . Some groups o f
men and boys were taken away and executed. Girls and women were also
abducted but, contrary to what happened before in the South, they do not seem to
have been sold as slaves. They were simply used as sexual toys for a few days
and then either let go or murdered.
Further, Prunier (2005:102) explains that the Janjaweed spoke to their victim s as if they
understood the gravity o f their genocidal acts:
genocidal elements were present in the oft-repeated remarks and insults o f the
attackers who derided their victims as “Blacks” or “like slaves”, who in the future
would not be allowed to live in Darfur. Some o f the attackers would even clearly
spell out the economic and ecological m otivations for the actions, as when one
attacker said “You are in the fields, the rest is for our horses. You have nothing
for yourselves.” Then the facts that the governm ent supported the attacks was
repeated a d naseum, as if the perpetrators needed to convince them selves o f their
good fortune.
The government both knew and sanctioned the Janjaweed to execute the violence
described above in the villages o f African tribes. However, as international pressure to
find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Darfur and South Sudan grew, the governm ent
placed the blame on the m ilitias and denied collusion or com plicity in their acts (Cockett
2010; Prunier 2005).
The conflict in Darfur is not a spontaneous eruption o f violence. Rather, it is the
result o f longstanding neglect and political underrepresentation that led rebels groups to
strike out to dem and equality. These attacks were then met with great violence by a
government-backed militia that sought to destroy villages o f the opposition, typically
African tribes, to the point o f no return to the village after the attack.
Violence continues to date. W hen international institutions o f social control and
other States called for peace and urged the GoS to work towards a resolution, the
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conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan were often lumped together. Although the conflicts
were very different, violence in southern Sudan muddied the waters o f the Darfur conflict
because they ran concurrently for a time. Essentially, the South Sudan conflict and
secession involved the opposition o f an Islamic government by the prim arily Christian
and anim ist believers in the south (Prunier 2005). It was this conflict that the peace
m eetings centered upon. In fact, Prunier (2005) notes that Darfur was not a part o f the
Com prehensive Peace A greement at all. The peace process will be discussed in great
detail in the next chapter as the UN and other organizations played a m ajor role in how
the process evolved. It is mentioned here only generally to point out that the GoS had no
real desire to bring peace to Darfur. The data findings in the next chapter will review the
interventions discussed and applied by the UN from 2002 through the end o f June, 2012.
The discussion o f genocide itself and the pow er o f labels were not present in this
narrative because they are discussed at length in the analysis.
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CHAPTER VI
DATA FINDINGS

The conflict described in the previous chapter was often discussed at the United
Nations and within the UNSC. M any o f the discussions by UN General Assem bly
(UNGA) members focused on fiscal matters related to intervention, were general reports
on the deployment o f UNAM ID (African Union - United N ation M ission in
Darfur)/UNM1S (United Nations M ission in Sudan), or discussed matters related to
Darfur but not specific to the conflict. The docum ents included in the sample (n=390)
contained only those docum ents with meaningful discussions, (i.e., a m em ber o f the P5,
the EU, AU, or the offices o f the Secretary-General were involved in the discussion and
the conflict was discussed specifically and directly). The docum ents that made up the
sample will be discussed in detail chronologically.

Table 1. Documents Included in Sample by Year.
Year
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total

N
1
5
90
92
60
53
27
19
17
18
8
390
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It is important to note that there were literally hundreds o f decisions that extended
m andates for UNM IS, UNAM ID, and other UN m echanism s or requested reports from
stakeholders and investigators. In an effort not to overwhelm with each and every
discussion/decision related to Darfur, the m ajor items follow. The com plex nature o f the
Darfuri conflict and intervention decisions required that findings be analyzed
chronologically. That perm itted a more holistic understanding o f how the discussions
evolved over time.
The rebel strike in February 2003 is the incident most often identified as the
turning point in the protracted Darfuri conflict (M ullins and Rothe 2008; Prunier 2005).
The analysis period extended to the year prior in an effort to determ ine if D arfur was on
the agenda o f the United N ations or UNSC prior to that point. This was important
because violence had been a part o f life in Darfur for more than twenty years before it
erupted onto the international agenda. There was a single Darfur related docum ent in
August o f 2002 in which some from the M asalit villages, “claim ed that the depopulation
o f villages, displacement and changes in land ownership are allegedly part o f a
government strategy to alter the dem ography o f the region” (United N ations 2002:9).
The Governm ent o f Sudan (GoS) m aintained that, “the conflict in D arfur results from
intertribal disputes deriving from the com petition for land between pastoral and crop
farmers in the area” (United N ations 2002:9).
Greater attention was awarded the violence and conflict after February 2003. For
exam ple, in M arch 2003, two NGOs, the W orld Federation o f Democratic Youth and
African Society o f International and Comparative Law and Interfaith International,
reported that the Darfuri conflict had undergone a change. The joint statement detailed

that the militia was being used to remove Africans from villages and replace them with
Arabs, even going so far as changing the names o f villages to Arabic names (United
Nations 2003c:3). The report identified the roots o f the conflict as resource scarcity and
desertification (United N ations 2003c).
The UN Comm ission on Human Rights (UNCHR) supported Amnesty
International’s request for a UN inquiry based on the fear that continuation o f the conflict
may “destabilize the whole country” (United N ations 2003b:2). Various term s were used
to describe the conflict, such as a “deteriorating security situation” (United N ations
2003d:372), ethnic conflict (United Nations 2003d), and “ gross, systematic atrocities
com mitted against the indigenous people o f the Darfur region” (United N ations 2003a:3).
The word Janjaweed was first used in discussion at the UN in July 2003 (United
Nations 2003d). It was also at this point that the UN was told that the governm ent was
arming the Janjaweed, and had been for three decades (United Nations 2003a). Finally,
the conflict was described as one that required attention and quick resolution (United
Nations 2003a).
G reater attention was paid to Darfur in 2004. The European Union w eighed in for
the first tim e in M arch 2004, stating that it was “alarmed at reports that Janjaweed
m ilitias continue to systematically target villages and centres [sic] for internally displaced
persons in their attacks” (United Nations 2004w:2). The first mention o f the Fur,
Zaghawa and M asalit as the three groups targeted in the attacks occurred in April 2004
by the UN Comm ission on Human Rights (United Nations 2004z).
A special expert on the situation o f human rights in the Sudan was appointed in
April 2004 and asked to report findings to the General Assem bly in later sessions (United
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Nations 2004ae:l 1). The report indicated that the GoS was supporting the Janjaw eed and
that the conflict contained ethnic elements (United N ations 2004ad): “ [i]n other words,
and worryingly, what appears to have been an ethnically based rebellion has been met
with an ethnically based response, building in large part on long-standing, but largely
hitherto contained, tribal rivalries” (United N ations 2004ad:6). It was also here that the
African versus Arab nature o f the conflict was first used in a UN document, where
“ [t]hose interviewed invariably described the Janjaw eed as being exclusively “ A rab”, as
opposed to the victim s who were described as “black” or “A frican” (United N ations
2004ad:l 1). The report summed up the conflict in this way: “ [ajlthough the mission
accepts that there are com plex tribal and resource dim ensions permeating the current
conflict, it considers that there are other powerful undercurrents rooted in the system atic
marginalization o f certain groups” (United N ations 2004ad:21).
Despite calls for peace, the word genocide was first m entioned in relation to
D arfur on February 4, 2004 but only in question form at as to the extent and m otivation o f
violence. Acting United N ations High C om m issioner on Human Rights (UNH CH R)
Egeland was asked if the genocide label was appropriate to the events occurring there; he
instead defined it as a “system atic depopulation o f areas” (United N ations 2004y:2). A
few months later, on June 25, 2004, United N ations Secretary-General (U NSG ) Annan
was asked a similar question in a press conference where he stated:
Let me say that, on the question o f what is happening in Darfur, there has been
lots o f discussion as to whether it is genocide or ethnic cleansing, and I, m yself, in
Geneva had indicated that, from the report 1 was getting, it was bordering on
ethnic cleansing. But let me say that the issue is not to discuss what nam e to give
it... We don’t need a label to propel us to act, and so 1 think we should act now
and stop arguing about which label to put on it. (U nited N ations 2004an)
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The labeling o f the conflict, however, became a m ajor issue in later intervention
discussions. The Peace and Security Council o f the African Union stated that the conflict
in Darfur could not be categorized as genocide (United N ations 20041; t) and the Arab
League agreed (United N ations 20041). The NGO W orld Education Fund disagreed and
implored UNSG Annan to invoke the Genocide Convention (United N ations 2004c; e).
In July 2004, the US Congress declared the events in Darfur genocide (United Nations
2004al).
W ith continued violence, a September 2004 UNSG press release detailed actions
taken in response to claim s o f genocide in Darfur.
As you know, the Security Council is discussing the resolution on Darfur, which
may require me to appoint an international com m ission to decide w hether acts o f
genocide have been com m itted...B ut I want to make it clear that, no m atter how
the crimes that are being com mitted against civilians in Darfur are characterized
or legally defined, it is urgent to take action n o w ... This is the firs t time in the
C o u n cil’s history that it has ever been seized under article 8 o f the Genocide
Convention, and it seems to me inconceivable that it should fail to respond
(em phasis added). (United N ations 2 0 04q:l)
The International Com m ission o f Inquiry into D arfur was officially requested from the
UNSG by the UNSC on Septem ber 18, 2004 (United N ations 2004aj), with the support o f
the EU (United N ations 2004v). The Comm ission o f Inquiry was chaired by Italian
Antonio Cassese, form er President o f the International Criminal Tribunal for the Form er
Yugoslavia, along with Therese Striggner Scott o f Ghana, M ohamed Fayek o f Egypt,
Hina Jilani o f Pakistan, Diego Garcia-Sayan o f Peru, and Dumisa N tsebeza o f South
Africa (United N ations 2004s).
A call to action under the Genocide Convention was not the only avenue o f
intervention discussed at the UN. The responsibility to protect was also mentioned in
relation to Darfur in 2004, here, as will be discussed in the analysis, the use o f R2P has
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significant meaning in the discourse, framing, and labeling o f the conflict. The Canadian
UN representative explained:
[w]e must not let debates about definitions becom e obstacles to actio n ...P u t
simply, there is still no explicit provision in international law for intervention on
humanitarian grounds. The responsibility to protect is intended to fill that gap. It
says that we should have the legal right to intervene in a country on the grounds
o f humanitarian emergency alone. We should be able to do so when the
Government o f a country is unwilling or unable to protect its people from extreme
harm as a result o f internal war, repression or, simply, State failure. (United
Nations 2004j:30-l)
The UNSG supported a similar position before the UNSC where he said that, “ [t]he
whole world is watching this tragedy unfold, and it is w atching us. No one can be
allowed to sidestep or ignore their responsibility to protect the innocent
civilians... W hatever name we give it, it imposes responsibilities on all o f us” (United
Nations 2004ao: 1).
In 2004, the words to describe the conflict include “reign o f terror” (United
N ations 2004ac:2), “ethnic cleansing” (United N ations 2004d; j; United N ations 2004u: 1;
United Nations 2004y:3; United Nations 2004ah:3), “one o f the w orld’s worst, and one o f
its most neglected, humanitarian crises” (United N ations 2004y:l), “ethnicity-induced
and tribally-m otivated conflict” (United N ations 2004aa:4), w ar crimes (United N ations
2004a; United Nations 2004ab:121), “w orld’s worst humanitarian crisis” (U nited N ations
2004am:2), “gross and systematic violations o f international humanitarian law ” (United
Nations 2004p:2), crimes against humanity (United Nations 2004a; r; United Nations
2004ab:12), and genocide (United Nations 2004c; e; i; j; United Nations 2004k:31;
United Nations 2004al).
The following year, 2005, the International Com m ission o f Inquiry into Darfur
was formed under the precepts o f the Genocide Convention. The Report o f the
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International Com m ission o f Inquiry into D arfur (RICID), published in February 2005
(United Nations 20051), was significant as it was the bedrock for many policy decisions.
The report’s most important finding was that genocide was not occurring in Darfur but
that the violence may have genocidal components.
Genocidal intent was ultimately not found based on a several factors. One o f
those factors was “the attackers refrained from exterm inating the whole population that
had not fled, but instead selectively killed groups o f young m en” (United Nations
20051:139). Also, those displaced from attacked villages were allowed to live in camps
that were not targeted by the Janjaweed. The Com m ission sum m ed their logic by
explaining that the G overnm ent o f Sudan lacked genocidal intent. The Comm ission
found “discrim inatory and persecutory intent” in the attacks upon the Fur M asalit, and
Zaghawa tribes and found the Governm ent o f Sudan responsible for “m urder as a crime
against hum anity., .[and] persecution as a crime against humanity" (United Nations
20051:141). The report found war crim es and/or crim es against humanity had occurred
and asked that the UNSC have the International Criminal Court (ICC) conduct an
investigation into the events in Darfur in relation to individuals who may be responsible
for said crim es (United Nations 20051). Soon thereafter, the UNSG (United Nations
20 0 5 x :l) stated that “ [t]he Comm ission has established that the Governm ent o f Sudan
and the Janjaweed are responsible for crimes under international law.”
After the release o f the RICID, the UNCHR appointed Emmanuel Akwei Addo as
an independent expert on the situation o f hum an rights in the Sudan (United Nations
2005k). Despite the RICID, UNSG Annan wanted the African Union to run point on
Darfur rather than “ ‘cannibalise’ [sic] the United Nations [northern/southern Sudan]
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peacekeeping mission there for the sake o f Darfur’' (United Nations 2005y: 1). Although
these conflicts were very different in nature and dynamic, they were often lumped
together as ‘Sudanese conflicts’ and seen as a single problem. It was specifically stated
that Darfur should not derail peace in the South (United N ations 2005y), although the
conflicts were mutually exclusive. However, because the conflicts ran concurrently, they
were often addressed jointly in UN and UNSC discussions, im pacting the framing,
labeling, and perceived definition o f the situation, as will be discussed more fully in the
following chapter.
The UNSC then established the United Nations M ission in Sudan (UNM IS) on
March 24, 2005 (United Nations 2005o) to work in collaboration with the African Union
M ission in Sudan (AM IS) already underway. On March 31, 2005, the UNSC went on to
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC despite opposition from China and the US prim arily based upon the protection o f sovereignty (see analysis section for details)
(United Nations 2005p).
Although not directly labeling the conflict a genocide, many references were
made to Rwanda and learning a lesson about waiting too long to get involved (United
N ations 2005j; 2006o; 2008k). Others similarly com pared Bosnia/Srebrenica (United
Nations 2004g; 2005f; g; j; 2006m; 20081) and Yugoslavia (United Nations 2004f; g; h;
aa; ai; 2005i; j; 2007h; 2012a) with Darfur. “UN Human Rights Coordinator for Sudan,
Mukesh K apila...declared that Darfur was “the w orld’s greatest humanitarian crisis” and
that “the only difference between Rwanda and Darfur is now the num ber involved”
(Prunier 2005:126).
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Descriptors o f the conflict during 2005 included genocide (United N ations 2005d;
i; w), crimes against humanity (United Nations 20051; x), war crim es (United Nations
20051; x), “scorched earth policy” (United N ations 2005m: 1), and ethnic cleansing
(United Nations 2005b). The Special Representative o f the Secretary-General for the
Sudan, Jan Pronk, called the conflict “civil war” (United N ations 2005s:3).
During 2006, the Panel o f Experts described that the conflict had once again
changed in nature, “ (w]hereas previously the large-scale attacks perpetrated by the parties
to the conflict...posed the m ost critical threat to the right to life, now the pattern has
changed to reflect a large num ber o f discrete violations (rather than large-scale
violations)” (United N ations 2006e:7). These “discrete violations” are described as
“violations o f the right to life, violations o f the prohibition o f torture... rape and other
forms o f sexual violence; and arbitrary arrest and detention o f individuals” (United
N ations 2006e:7).
A nother change began in February 2006 with discussions o f conversion from an
African Union-led m ission in D arfur (AM IS) to one led by the UN - the United N ations
M ission in Darfur (U NAM ID) (United N ations 2006s), here again, depicting diffusion o f
responsibility as will be discussed more fully in the analysis. Before such
im plem entation could occur, however, the UNSC deployed UNM IS into D arfur (United
N ations 2006k).
Conflict descriptors remained much the same as in previous years and included
w ar crim es (United N ations 2006r), crimes against humanity (United N ations 2006r),
ethnic cleansing (United N ations 2006c; j), and genocide (United N ations 2006a; m).
UNSG Annan also called Darfur “currently the w orld’s largest relief operation, some
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13,000 aid workers are struggling to assist 3 million destitute people— h alf o f D arfur's
population’’ (United N ations 2006h:38). The responsibility to protect doctrine (R2P) was
also discussed several tim es this year in relation to D arfur (e.g., United N ations 2006g;
o). UNSG Annan used the word “test” in relation to Darfur when he addressed the R2P
and Darfur, calling for im m ediate action.
By 2007, another international body had taken great interest in the matter: the
International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC handed down arrest warrants related to the
Darfuri conflict, finding that Ahmad M uhammad Harun, who was previously the
Sudanese M inister o f State for the Interior, and Ali M uhamm ad Ali Abd-Al Rahman, also
known as Ali Kushayb, head o f the Janajweed, conspired together to raid villages and
attack civilians in Darfur. Both men were charged with crim es against humanity and war
crimes. These two arrest w arrants were not the last issued in relation to the crisis.
In addition to protesting the arrest warrants, the Government o f Sudan continued
to protest the conversion o f AM IS to the hybrid mission com bining UN and AU efforts—
the African Union/U nited N ations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAM ID)— due to the
resulting infusion o f non-A frican troops into the area. At the Abuja peace talks, it was
agreed that the UN and AU would jointly appoint certain leadership positions within
UNAM ID, with heavy African involvement in the mission (United Nations 2007i).
UNAM ID was described as “an unprecedented partnership between the United Nations
and the African Union. It is an expression o f our collective com mitment to end the
tragedy o f Darfur” (United N ations 2007r:2). However, AU Chairperson Konare
remained hesitant in this endeavor; he explained “that despite the crucial im portance o f
partnership with the international community, and as much as the African Union needed
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its promised support, it was essential that A frica’s partners not intervene unduly. The era
o f colonialism was over” (United Nations 2007a: 1). This delicate balance between
intervention without the perception o f interference in state affairs and sovereignty was a
constant theme in relation to aiding Darfur.
UNAM ID was not the only operation established in 2007. The United Nations
M ission in the Central African Republic and Chad (M INURCAT) was created in
September 2007 to address the conflict that spilled across the borders shared with Darfur.
Conflict labels applied in 2007 included war crimes (United N ations 2007g),
crimes against humanity (United N ations 2007g), genocide (United N ations 2007b; c; d;
r; u), “gross and systematic violations o f human rights and grave breaches o f international
humanitarian law” (United Nations 2007f:8). President George W. Bush stated that the
“w orld’s greatest humanitarian disaster is happening [in D arfur]” (United N ations
2007r:17) and continued to identify the conflict as genocide at the UN (United Nations
2007b; r). The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency
Relief Coordinator, Sir John Holmes, spoke on the three-year anniversary o f the first
brief to the UNSC related to Darfur and warned that “the politicization and m ilitarization
o f camps have becom e a fact o f life, creating a time bomb ju st waiting to go o f f ’ (United
Nations 2007p:4). Ban Ki-moon was appointed UNSG in January 2007 and continued
former-UNSG A nnan’s lead in cam paigning for peace in the area and brought attention to
Darfur often and passionately. He identified the crisis as his “top priority” or “most
urgent priority” on several occasions (e.g., United Nations 2007e:3; United Nations
2007k:2; United Nations 2007n:l). ICC C hief Prosecutor M oreno-Ocam po summed up
the situation and his investigation by stating that “ [a]ll inform ation points not to chaotic
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and isolated acts, but to a pattern o f attacks... [cjalling those crimes chaos or ‘sporadic
violence' or ‘inter-tribal clashes’ is a cover up” (United N ations 2007s:4).
In 2008, attention to Darfur continued. However, much o f the discussions related
to the crisis focused on UNAM ID and its deployment, budget, staffing, and other
technical matters rather than the conflict itself (i.e., see United Nations 2008a; f; h).
M oreno-Ocam po continued to try to obtain custody o f Harun and Kushayb, to no
avail (United N ations 20081). The GoS sustained its denial that it was subject to the
jurisdiction o f the ICC, thus ignoring the arrest w arrants (United N ations 20081). In June
o f 2008, the EU began discussing the possibility o f sanctioning the GoS for failure to
cooperate with the ICC (United N ations 2008g). The UNSC considered drafting a
statement in relation to the ongoing lack o f Sudanese cooperation with the ICC but the
measure was not passed; M oreno-Ocampo placed the blame for preventing the issuance
o f the statement prim arily on China (United N ations 2008g) (for more details, see next
chapter). Further com plicating matters, one o f the indictees, Harun, was appointed
M inister o f Humanitarian Affairs (United N ations 2008g).
A related m ajor event in the chronology o f Darfur occurred in July 2008, when
ICC C hief Prosecutor M oreno-Ocam po asked for arrest warrants for President al-Bashir
(United Nations 2008i). The charges were genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes based on al-B ashir’s statement the he “wantfed] no prisoners or wounded, only
scorched earth” in D arfur (United Nations 2008n:2). Noted here is the labeling o f the
conflict back to genocide as well as crimes against humanity. The request to indict
President al-Bashir created a host o f negative responses in the United N ations and the
UNSC. The UK (United N ations 2005u), China (United N ations 2008c; n), the Russian
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Federation (United Nations 2005u; 2008n), the AU (United Nations 2008n), and the
League o f Arab States (United Nations 2008n), among others, spoke in reference to the
im pact an attempt to indict the President o f Sudan might have on the peace process
(United Nations 2005u). Several states, as well as the AU, requested that the ICC either
term inate or suspend attempts to indict Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (United
Nations 2005u).
The word genocide was now linked to D arfur by the request for an arrest warrant
for the Sudanese President on charges o f war crim es, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. There were a few other significant ways in which the conflict was discussed in
2008. For example, the UN Representative from Switzerland portrayed the conflict in
this manner:
[t]he situation in the Sudan was characterized by a lack o f fundamental freedoms,
persistent human rights violations and devastating poverty. It was regrettable that
the Government had nominated as head o f a com mission to investigate the human
rights situation in Darfur a person who had been by indicted the International
Criminal Court. The situation in the Sudan continued to warrant the C ouncil’s full
attention. (United Nations 2008d:2)
The Executive Secretary o f the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
called Darfur “ [t]he biggest humanitarian crisis o f this decade” (United N ations 2008e:2).
Darfur was also lumped in with the northern-southern Sudan conflict as “the longest civil
war in Africa." (United Nations 2008b: 1). Along with the arrest warrant and evidencedbased charges o f genocide, the year 2008 was also a turning point in the discourse o f the
conflict and marked decline in the quantity o f discussions o f Darfur at the UN over the
next few years (see Table 1 and Table 2).
The following year, in early 2009, the charges o f genocide were rejected by the
Pre-Trial Cham ber o f the ICC. The appeal on the genocide charge was denied based “on
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the issue o f the correct standard o f p roof at the arrest warrant stage” (United Nations
2009b:2). This decision was met with much opposition at the UN and UNSC. The
Russian Federation and China continued to be vocal in their disapproval using words to
justify their opposition in relation to sovereignty (United Nations 2009c). The AU also
disagreed with the indictm ent (United N ations 2009c).
M ost o f the discussion in 2010 centered on the arrest w arrants issued by the ICC
in relation to Darfur. Importantly, M oreno-Ocam po announced that once the standard o f
proof used was corrected, “ [o]n 12 July 2010, Pre-Trial Cham ber I issued a second
warrant o f arrest with respect to three counts o f genocide” (United N ations 2010b:3).
This lack o f discussion on D arfur continued through 2011 with only a few notable
statements
The same pattern continued in 2012. The arrest warrants rem ained a concern,
along with the lack o f cooperation o f states. There were few other meaningful
discussions related to D arfur in 2012. The analysis period extended through the end o f
June, 2012.
This chronology delineates the progression o f discussions related to Darfur. They began
slowly and grew to be a large part o f the UN and UNSC agendas in 2004, 2005, 2006,
and 2007. From 2008 through the end o f the analysis period at the end o f June, 2012,
both the quantity and quality o f the discussions turned from the conflict itself to the
issues surrounding it, such as the funding and make-up o f UNAM ID, arrest warrants and
compliance, and other concerns that brought the focus from the conflict and victim s to
other, more adm inistrative issues. The following, Table 3, lists the words used to
describe the conflict.
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T able 2. N um ber o f D ocum ents per Year.
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Table 3. W ords Used to Describe the Conflict by Year.
Year

Descriptors

2002

“depopulation o f villages, displacement
and changes in land ownership are
allegedly part o f a government strategy
to alter the dem ography o f the region”
“intertribal disputes deriving from the
competition for land between pastoral
and crop fanners in the area”
Government o f Sudan linked to arming
o f Janjaweed.
The conflict was described as one that
required attention and quick resolution.
The word Janjaweed first used at UN.

2003

2004

crimes against humanity

UN Document N um ber
A/57/326

A/57/326

E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/SR. 19
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/SR.19
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/27
A/C.3/59/L.48, A/59/319,
S/2004/881
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T able 3. Continued.

Year
2004

Descriptors
“ethnic cleansing”

“ethnicity-induced and triballymotivated conflict”
genocide

“gross and systematic violations o f
international humanitarian law”
“one o f the w orld’s worst, and one o f its
most neglected, humanitarian crises”

2005

“reign o f terror”
“w orld’s worst humanitarian crisis”
“civil war”
crimes against humanity
ethnic cleansing
genocide

2006

UN Document N um ber
E/CN.4/2004/SR.60,
A/59/PV.5, S/2004/505, Press
Briefing on Humanitarian
Crisis in Darfur Sudan,
E/2004/SR. 11
E/CN.4/2004/NGO/203
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/SR.2,
E/C N .4/Sub.2/2004/N G O /2,
A /59/PV.3, A/59/PV.5,
A /59/PV.6, S/PV.5015
A/59/282
Press Briefing on
Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur
Sudan
A/59/36
E/2004/SR.37
S/PV.5109
S/2005/60, SG/SM /9700A FR /1101
E/CN.4/2005/NGO/233

“no action” vote

E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/SR.3,
A/S-28/PV.1, A/C.3/60/SR.32
E/CN.4/2006/NGO/3

“scorched earth policy”

S/2005/68

war crimes

S/2005/60, SG/SM /9700A FR /1101
E/CN.4/2006/71/A dd.6

crimes against humanity
“currently the w orld’s largest relief
operation, some 13,000 aid workers are
struggling to assist 3 million destitute
people— h alf o f D arfur’s population”
ethnic cleansing
genocide
related to the responsibility to protect
doctrine
“test” o f the responsibility to protect
doctrine
war crimes

A/61/1 (SUPP)

E/CN.4/2006/NGO/225.
A /6 1/275
A/61/PV.10, S/PV.5434
SG/SM /10633, S/PV.5520
SC/8823
E/CN.4/2006/71 /A dd.6

75

T able 3. Continued.

Year

Descriptors

2007

“All information points not to chaotic
and isolated acts, but to a pattern o f
attack s.. .[c]alling those crim es chaos or
‘sproradic violence’ or ‘inter-tribal
clashes’ is a cover up”
crimes against humanity
genocide

“gross and systematic violations o f
hum an rights and grave breaches o f
international hum anitarian law”
“The continuing conflict in Darfur has
put at stake not only innocent lives and
the moral im perative to protect them,
but also the credibility o f the United
N ations.”
“The persistence o f that situation was a
badge o f shame for the international
com munity.”
“the politicization and m ilitarization o f
cam ps have become a fact o f life,
creating a tim e bom b ju st waiting to go
o ff’
UNSG K i-m oon’s “top priority” or
“most urgent priority”

2008

UN Document N um ber
S/PV.5789

A/HRC/4/80
A/62/PV.4, A/62/PV.9,
A /62/PV.10, S/PV.5749,
A /C.3/61/SR.40
A /HRC/4/SR.5

A/62/1 (SUPP)

A /HRC/4/SR.5

S/PV.5655

A/62/PV.27, A/62/1 (SUPP),
SG /SM /11153-A FR/l 582

war crimes
“w orld’s greatest hum anitarian disaster”

A/HRC/4/80
S/PV.5749

“D arfur shows the urgent needs that yet
have to be m et.”

S/PV.5868

“The biggest hum anitarian crisis o f this
decade”

S/2008/125

‘the longest civil w ar in Africa."

D SG /SM /391-A FR /1692
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T able 3. Continued.

Year

Descriptors

2008

“The situation in the Sudan was
characterized by a lack o f fundamental
freedoms, persistent human rights
violations and devastating poverty. It
was regrettable that the Government had
nominated as head o f a com mission to
investigate the human rights situation in
D arfur a person who had been by
indicted the International Criminal
Court. The situation in the Sudan
continued to warrant the C ouncil’s full
attention”
“The situation remains grim today, as
then, if not worse. Violence targeting
civilians, including women and girls,
continues at alarm ing levels with no
accountability, or end, in sight.”
None. Discourse centered on arrest
warrants o f President al-Bashir and
repercussions.
None. Discourse centered on arrest
warrants o f President al-Bashir and
repercussions.
None. Discourse centered on arrest
warrants o f President al-Bashir and
repercussions.
None. Discourse centered on arrest
warrants o f President al-Bashir and
repercussions.

2009

2010

2011

2012

UN Document N um ber
A /HRC/6/SR.34

SG/SM /11496-AFR/1675

While the significance o f the discourse used to define the situation in Darfur will
be analyzed in the following section, it is essential to note how many times each P5 state
was involved in the discourse related to Darfur (see Table 4). It is also important to
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connect the discourse to the chronology o f UN interventions and policy decisions as
noted in Table 5.

Table 4. Breakdown o f P5 State Discourse.
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T able 5. Sum m ary o f U N D e c isio n s and Interventions Included in C ase Study.

Date

UN Document N um ber

Decision/Intervention

23-A pr-2004

E/CN.4/2004/L.1 l/A dd.8

11-Jun-2004

S /R E S /1547

30-Jul-2004

S/RES/1556

7-Aug-2004

A/58/PV

18-Sep-2004

S /R E S /1564

18-Sep-2004

A FR/1027-HR/4793

11-Oct-2004

S/2004/812

31-Oct-2004

S/RES/1569

UN C om m ission on Human Rights (U NHRC) asks for
appointm ent o f an Independent Expert on the Situation o f
Human Rights in the Sudan
UNSC created U NA M IS (UN A dvance M ission in Sudan)
as a "special political mission" to address the peace process
UNSC dem ands disarm am ent and prosecution o f
Janjaweed, establishes arms em bargo, state that further
non-m ilitary options will be used i f GoS noncom pliant,
asks for m onthly reports from U N SG on the situation
UNSG creates Special A dvisor on the Prevention o f
Genocide (and other m assive violations o f hum an rights)
Requested U NSG create International C om m ission o f
Inquiry into D arfur to determ ine if conflict genocidal, also
threatened sanctions on oil sector (proposed by US and
UK, am ong others)
United N ations H igh C om m issioner and Special A dviser
on the Prevention o f G enocide visit D arfur
UNSG creates Com m ission o f Inquiry requested in
S/R ES/1556 and delineates their goals. R equests that it
report findings w ithin 90 days.
UNSC plans m eeting in Nairobi for N ovem ber 18-19, 2004
to talk peace in Sudan
Report o f the International Com m ission o f Inquiry into
Darfur. Request referral o f Darfur to ICC for possible w ar
crimes and crim es against humanity
UNSG supported referral to ICC but noted that is
something only UNSC can carry out

1-Feb-2005

S/2006/60

1-Feb-2005

SG /SM /9700-A FR /1101

A bstentions

C hina

China,
Russian
Federation

oo

T able 5. Continued.

Date

UN D ocum ent N um ber

28-Feb-2005

E/C N .4/2005/11

24-M ar-2005

S /R E S /1590

29-M ar-2005

S /R E S /1591

31-M ar-2005

S /R E S /1593

12-Apr-2005

S/2005/82

23-Sep-2005

S/RES/1627

3-Feb-2005

S/PRST/2006/5

25-Apr-2006

S /R E S /1672

26-A pr-2006

S/2006/341

28-Jul-2006

S/2006/591

Dec i s ion/Intervention
UN C om m ission on Human R ights appoints Independent
Expert on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Sudan
UNSC created UNM IS to work alongside A M IS and focus
on the CPA and peace in Darfur (C om prehensive Peace
Agreem ent) (UNM IS replacing U N A M IS)
Requested the UNSG appoint Panel o f Experts, created
assets freeze and travel bans related to Darfur
UNSC refers D arfur to ICC. ICC to report w ithin three
months then sem iannually thereafter
UNSG appoints Special R apporteur on the Situation o f
Human Rights in the Sudan
UNSC extended U NM IS m andate and request quarterly
report o f the m ission by the U N SG
UNSC request UNSG create plan for transition from A M IS
to AU/UN Joint M ission in Darfur (U N A M ID )
UNSC im posed travel bans and froze the assets o f M ajor
General G affar M oham ed Elhassan (Com m ander o f the
W estern M ilitary R egion for the Sudanese A rm ed Forces),
Sheikh M usa Hilal (Param ount C h ief o f the Jalul Tribe in
N orth Darfur), A dam Yacub Shant (Sudanese Liberation
A rm y Com m ander), Gabril Abdul K areem Badri (N ational
M ovem ent for Reform and D evelopm ent Field
Comm ander) for failure to com ply w ith UNSC decisions
UNSC to visit Sudan and Chad
UNSG proposed U NAM ID to begin 01/01/07 (pending
consent by GoS)____________________________________

A bstentions

China,
R ussian
Federation
China,
U nited States

T able 5. C ontinued.

Date

UN D ocum ent N um ber

D ecision/Intervention

S/RES/1706

UNSC support U N A M ID recom m endation

4-Dec-2006
9-Feb-2007

A/HRC/S-4/L. 1
A /6 1/530/Add. 2

UNHRC to send "urgent assessm ent m ission to Darfur"

7-M ar-2007

A/HRC/4/80

22-M ar-2007

A/HRC/4/L.7

31-Jul-2007

S /R E S /1769

25-Sep-2007

S/RES/1778

31-A ug-2006

UNHRC sends High Level Panel to address violations o f
human rights in Sudan
UNHRC report indicates AU, U N /U N SC actions thus far
ineffective at stem m ing tide o f violence in Darfur. Both
sides o f conflict violating decisions by UN and its bodies
UNHRC sends Special R apporteur on the Situation o f
Human Rights in the Sudan, Special Representative o f the
Secretary-General for Children and A rm ed Conflict,
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Sum m ary or A rbitrary
Executions, Special R epresentative o f the SecretaryGeneral on the Situation o f H um an R ights D efenders,
Special R apporteur on C ontem porary Forms o f Racism,
Racial D iscrim ination, X enophobia and R elated
Intolerance, Representative o f the Secretary-G eneral on
Human Rights o f Internally D isplaced Persons, Special
R apporteur on the Question o f Torture, and the Special
Rapporteur on V iolence against W om en, its Causes and
Consequences to Darfur________________________________
UNSC authorizes UNAM ID deploym ent
UNSC establishes the U nited N ations M ission in the
Central African Republic and Chad (M IN U R C A T) to aid
refugees and IDPs from Darfur

A bstentions
China,
R ussian
Federation

T able 5. Continued.

Date

UN D ocum ent N um ber

14-Feb-2008

S/RES/1778

16-Jun-2008

S/PRST/2008/21

31-Jul-2008

S/RES/1828

7-Jan-2011

S /2 0 1 1/7

D ecision/Intervention

A bstentions

UN U nder-Secretary General for Peacekeeping O perations
went to D arfur to iron out rem aining details o f U N A M ID
deploym ent w ith GoS
UNSC asks for GoS cooperation w ith ICC arrest w arrants
UNAM ID m andate renewed

U nited States

UNSC "visited the Sudan in order to reaffirm the
com m itm ent o f the international com m unity to and its
support for the full and timely im plem entation o f the
Com prehensive Peace A greem ent and to encourage a
peaceful, com prehensive and inclusive resolution for the
situation in Darfur"
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CHAPTER VII
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

The previous chapter discussed the data that em erged from the discourse o f the
conflict and a chronology o f the decisions and interventions by the UN into Darfur. The
discourse and subsequent decision-m aking in term s o f intervention has significant
implications. The following will address this drawing from the theoretical framework
presented in Chapter III.
W hen Darfur em erged on the international agenda, it was identified as a tribal or
ethnic conflict (United N ations 2003d) or as rebels striking out against their government.
This continued to be the case until 2004 when the International Com m ission o f Inquiry
into Darfur was sent to investigate the reports o f genocide in Darfur (United Nations
2004s; af; ag). The labels o f crim es against humanity and war crim es applied by the UN
in 2005 with the RICID (U nited Nations 20051) dictated every decision and intervention
that followed. This early discourse framed perceived definitions o f the situation o f the
international political players as well as caused strain and subsequent diffusion o f
responsibility.
Following the RICID (United N ations 20051:4), the determ ination “that the
Government o f Sudan has not pursued a policy o f genocide” m eant that UN or UNSC
intervention was no longer mandatory. It is important to note that the RICID (United
Nations 20051) contradicted findings by other international actors and scholars. Armenia
was the first to call D arfur “the twentieth century’s first genocide” (United Nations
20051), but would not be the last (e.g., Hagan and Rym ond-Richm ond 2009; Heinze
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2007; Jafari and W illiams 2005; M arkusen 2009; M ullins and Rothe 2007; 2008; Prunier
2005; Rothe and M ullins 2007; United Nations 2004i; m; 2005e). In 2004, the US
Congress called D arfur a genocide (United Nations 2004m: 17), as did President George
W. Bush in a speech at the UN (M arkusen 2009; Prunier 2005) and the European
Parliament (United N ations 2004al). “The increased level o f international interest in the
Darfur crisis following the invocation o f the term “genocide” seems to confirm the power
o f the “G-word”” (M ennecke 2009:168).
Some o f the findings that contradicted the RICID were completed after the initial
report however. This included the involvement o f the ICC and subsequent arrest
warrants for three counts o f genocide against Sudanese President O m ar al-B ashir in 2010
(United Nations 2010b). Additionally, individual statements by the US (United Nations
2004i) and the European Parliament (United N ations 2005e) identified Darfur as a
genocide. Despite the use o f the genocide label by others, the UN and UNSC stood
behind the determ ination o f crimes against humanity. This gap between the reality o f the
situation and the perception o f it by the UN and UNSC (Perinbanayagam 1974; Rothe
2009b), I believe, highlights the im pact on the political player’s definition o f the
situation.
This is the case even though the data detailed in the findings chapter indicated that
there was sufficient evidence available to the International Comm ission o f Inquiry into
Darfur and major political players to identify the conflict as genocide. Consider the
statem ent that later cam e out o f the Sudanese government:
Adam Hamid M usa, recent Governor o f South Darfur, [who] threatened that there
would be ‘m ore genocide such as has never before been seen by anyone’ if
President A l-B ashir were indicted; and President Al-Bashir him self said, ‘We are
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not looking for problems, but if they come to us, then we will teach them a lesson
that they will not forget.’ (United Nations 2008n-3)
These statements indicated that Sudanese government officials them selves were
identifying the conflict in Darfur as genocide while the UN was not. A dditionally, there
were a host o f others that found genocide was occurring in Darfur, m ost im portantly the
International Criminal Court (United N ations 2010b).
The contradiction between labels, discourse and subsequent labeling o f the
conflict can only partially be attributed to perceived definition o f the situation, given that
such perceptions are often formed to align with state interests (as will be discussed more
fully below). The perceived definition o f the situation also allow s the justification for
diffusion o f responsibility that was a factor in the years covered in this case study.
Additionally, with the RICID findings o f non-genocide, the UNSC was able to
defer the situation, regardless o f individual players perceived definition o f the situation
and calls for intervention, to other organizations, including the ICC (United N ations
20051). In this manner, the UNSC deferred responsibility for further investigation to the
ICC and could maintain a “hands clean” position, accepting or neutralizing their
decisions based o ff o f the official RICID findings. The UNSC could pronounce that the
UN had investigated, found crimes against humanity, and referred the matter to another
body for further inquiry. Therefore, the UNSC had executed its responsibility fully.
Another exam ple o f the diffusion o f responsibility may be found in the
deployment o f the AU for as long as possible in Darfur before the UN stepped in. In the
early years o f the conflict, the UN and the African Union agreed that the AU should
spearhead the interventions and the UN was to provide support only, consistent with the
“African solutions to African problem s” ideology o f the AU and the desire to keep
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former colonizers out o f the continent to the largest extent possible. The UN stated that
“ [cjlearly everyone's first preference is for the African Union to stay in the lead in
Darfur, but for the rest o f us to give it more effective help, while keeping other options
open” (United Nations 2005y:l). This diffusion o f responsibility allowed the UN to
remain bystanders to the conflict for as long as possible, until, ultimately the AU force
was deemed insufficient and the jo in t mission UNAM ID was formed in 2007 (United
N ations 20071).
However, after the ICC found evidence o f genocide, the original definition o f
crimes against hum anity was never revisited or revised. I will suggest this, too, is based
on the contradiction between moral obligations and states’ interests that have played out,
from extending the arms o f responsibility to others as well as using the ideology o f
sovereignty to ensure protection o f some o f the UNSC voting m em bers’ own internal
political, economic and military interests.
The diffusion o f responsibility was also way for states to neutralize the strain o f
com peting interests, between moral obligation and individual state’s vested economic,
political and m ilitary interests. Strain was a factor in the UN and UNSC decision
making, prim arily in the form o f pressure from individual states, NGOs, IGOs, the media,
and other activist and/or organizations that called for the labeling o f genocide as well as
UN action from the onset and as the situation in Darfur worsened. This strain can also be
interpreted as the outcom e o f com peting interests o f states: moral obligation, political
pressure and states vested self-interests. For exam ple, US Senator and Presidential
Candidate John Kerry explained simply that the US could not provide more than
humanitarian assistance to D arfur was because “we’re [militarily] overextended” (New
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York Times 2004:15). Several UN and NGO docum ents (i.e., Amnesty International
2012; Human Rights First N.d.; United Nations 2009a; United N ations Security Council
2007) link both China and the Russian Federation to ammunition found in Darfur despite
the arms embargo instituted by the UNSC in 2004 (United N ations 2004af; 2009a).
Sudan has separate oil contracts with the US, France, and China (United N ations 2007j).
The vested and com peting interests in Sudan by these states created strain in relation to
Darfuri intervention. Additionally, the trend o f docum ents that involved discussions o f
Darfur is the result o f this external pressure as evidenced by the increase in documents
referencing the situation. There were only five docum ents doing so in 2003, then 90 in
2004, 92 in 2005, and 60 in 2006 (see Table 2). Pressure to intervene was not the only
form o f strain present.
As highlighted by international relations theory, states may refuse to com m it to
the right or moral course o f action because it may be inconsistent with the opposing, but
equally strong, desire for protection o f self-interest and security at all costs. As noted, the
com peting interests o f states, including the ongoing contradiction o f some between their
perceived definition o f the situation (i.e., US) and their support (or lack thereof) for
adhering to the Genocide Convention played a m ajor role in the decision-m aking process
at the UN and UNSC. Many states, including the P5, expressed a desire to intervene in
Darfur but none provided assistance that would reduce the state’s existing level o f power.
Additionally, there was evidence o f strain and com peting interests in term s o f specific
states’ interests, much o f which translated into arguing for the importance o f recognizing
state sovereignty.
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The deference to Sudan’s sovereignty was declared as a m ajor factor in the
decision-making for intervention, first by non-use o f the G enocide Convention that was
‘justified’ through the alternative labeling o f crim es against humanity and subsequently
through discussion o f using the R2P ideology or doctrine. The U N ’s High Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change explained the limits to sovereignty when discussing
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine:
[t]he successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and H erzegovina, Rwanda,
Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the im m unities o f
sovereign Governm ents but their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the
w ider international community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not
the “right to intervene” o f any State, but the “responsibility to protect” o f every State
when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe— mass m urder and
rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and
exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign
Governments have the prim ary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such
catastrophes, when they are unable or unw illing to do so that responsibility should be
taken up by the wider international com m unity (em phasis in original). (United
N ations 2004g:56-7)
This sentiment was echoed by the ICISS and the W orld Summit O utcom e D ocum ent
(United Nations 2005a) (see also Hubert 2010; United Nations Security Council 2006),
none o f which tie these responsibilities to a determ ination o f genocide
Nonetheless, the sovereignty o f Sudan was a com mon them e throughout the data,
primarily from several states, including Sudan. Sudan made several dem ands upon the
UN in regards to protection o f its sovereignty and the UN/UNSC conceded each time.
For exam ple, Sudan dem anded that a UNAM ID be primarily African to keep form er
colonizing western nations from interfering (United N ations 2006d; f; 2007a). The UN
relented (United Nations 2006i).

Sudan denied travel visas into Darfur for UN delegates

on several occasions (United N ations 2007g).
The Thirty-Second Session o f the Islamic Conference:
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Reiterate[d] its full solidarity with Sudan in consolidating peace and stability
countrywide and in defending its sovereignty and integral unity, and in this regard
calls upon the international community to adhere to the full observance o f
Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. (United N ations 2005n:65)
The Special Representative o f the Secretary-General for the Sudan, Jan Pronk explained
that the United N ations’ “only aim is to protect the people, while respecting the
sovereignty o f the Sudanese nation” (United Nations 2006p:5). The UK made a
statement that:
We must therefore redouble our efforts — in the United Nations, the AU, the
European Union, the League o f Arab States and the Organization o f the Islamic
Conference — as friends o f the Sudan and its peoples, to make clear the positive
contribution the United N ations will make in Darfur, in full respect o f the
sovereignty o f the Sudan and with a heavy African character to the force, as the
Council has repeatedly made clear. (United N ations 2006p:7)
Protection o f sovereignty was also important to the P5. For exam ple, although
proclaim ing to be in support o f peace throughout the analysis period, the voting behavior
o f China did not reconcile with its formal discourse. I suggest that this, in part, is due to
C hina’s long standing foreign policy o f soft power and non-intervention in sovereign
territory as well as its vested interests in the area. Here again, it should be noted that such
a position, soft power, is grounded in a deeper self-interest given the historical record o f
human rights violations and general oppression within China and realistic need to ensure
non-external intervention in their domestic affairs. China summed its position in this
manner:
China has worked in a consistent, active and responsible manner to advance the
peace process in the Sudan, devoting great attention to finding an appropriate
solution to the problems o f Darfur. We have often pointed out to the Sudan that
the only objective o f the United Nations in taking over the task o f AMIS is to help
the Sudan im plem ent the Darfur Peace Agreement. That is also the broad
consensus o f the international community. We hope that the Governm ent o f the
Sudan will proceed from the perspective o f its long-term developm ent and take a
flexible approach. At the same time, we consider that the Security Council should
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respect the views o f the national Government in question and that no United
Nations peacekeeping operation should be imposed. M oreover, we m ust pay heed
to the influence and the roles o f the relevant regional organizations. We believe
that if all the parties take a frank and pragmatic approach, enhance mutual trust
and cooperation and broaden their perspective, we will certainly be able to
achieve an outcome that is satisfactory to everyone. (United N ations 2006o:12)
However, a 2007 statement by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
stated:
when Mr. Ocampo had last briefed the Council this past December, it ‘was
principally the obstruction o f the China that prevented the Council from adopting
a statem ent’. The Coalition hoped that China - ‘with its aspirations to play a
leading role on the world stage, with the ‘com ing out party’ for that role in the
form o f the Beijing Olym pics just two months aw ay’ — would take a more
reasonable and nuanced view as to where it stood in relationship to bringing to
justice those responsible for horrific crimes com m itted against the people o f
Darfur. ‘It would certainly be sorrowful to see the Olympic Games tainted with an
example o f Chinese support or com plicity for the obstruction o f justice by Sudan.’
(United N ations 2008g: 1)
C hina’s voting behavior displayed the state’s government-first, sovereignty above all else
stance, as stated, to protect domestic interests and its own self-protection from external
intervention. Consider the importance o f Sudan to China’s econom ic and political power;
China and Sudan have a history o f agreement in return for soft pow er policy - most
notably in terms o f economic ‘developm ent’ (United Nations 2007j). “A side from
building Sudan’s oil production infrastructure, such as the 930-m ile pipeline from the
southern oilfields to Port Sudan, China also invested about $20 billion in non-oil projects,
such as roads, agriculture projects and power stations” (Cockett 2010:273). Sudan is not
the only African state in which China invested in developm ent (Cockett 2010; United
Nations 2007j). However, “ [t]o put that figure into perspective, B ritain’s aid
development budget in 2006 to the whole w orld was about $8 billion” (em phasis in
original) (Cockett 2010:273). China won a bid to build a $650 million dam in Sudan in
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2004 (Cockett 2010). Additionally, “ [i]n 2007, China cancelled Sudanese debts worth
$80m[illion] and also promised to build a new presidential palace worth $12m [illion]”
(Cockett 2010:274).
Oil was an additional econom ic impetus for the pro-Sudanese government
decisions made by China. China and Sudan have a long-standing oil trade agreem ent
(Cockett 2010; Prunier 2005). That agreement was debated at the UN, where a Chinese
representative explained that “ [t]he relationship between China and the Sudan was
similar to its relations with other African countries. It was nothing special, as China
maintained friendly and cooperative relations with all the other A frican countries”
(United N ations 2007j: 1). Prunier (2005) places Sudanese exports to China in 2005 at
$3.4 billion, 96% o f which were petroleum related. This adds to the evidence o f a
mutually beneficial relationship that is im portant to both states and central to the
realpolitik evident therein.
A nother econom ic relationship between the two governm ents is manifest in the
proliferation o f arms into Sudan that has been linked to China (see Amnesty International
2012; Cockett 2010; United N ations 2009a). Chinese arms were located in Darfur
despite the arms em bargo levied by the UNSC (United N ations 2009a). “China is also
frequently accused o f having built two (or maybe even three) small-arms factories in
Khartoum that supply the governm ent with w eapons” (Cockett 2010:277). There were
several reports indicating a tw enty-five-fold increase in Chinese arms sales from 20022005 (e.g., Cockett 2010; Heavens 2007). Additionally, Reuters (Heavens 2007) reported
a 124% increase in trade o f w eapons through m id-2007 compared to the year before.
Cockett (2010:277) interviewed a Chinese em bassy representative, who explained that

91

“China sold some weapons to Sudan, but ‘only on the understanding that they are not
used in D arfur.’” In 2009, a panel investigated the proliferation o f Chinese-m anufactured
arms in Darfur in spite o f the UNSC arms embargo o f S/RES/1556 (2004af) and two
stolen Chinese-donated containers o f weapons and am m unitions in transit to UNAM ID
troops (United N ations 2009a). This investigation was not mentioned again in the
docum ents drawn on here.
The data indicated that China’s voting behavior often reflected a very proG ovem m ent o f Sudan stance. This may be seen in China’s vociferous disagreem ent with
the indictm ent o f President al-Bashir, the involvement o f the ICC in general and the
identification o f the crim es as less than genocidal (United N ations 2005u; 2008c; m; n;
2009c). China identified the conflict in manners that reduced the seriousness and level o f
violence in the region (United Nations 2007t), as well as downplayed the extent o f the
relationship between the two states (United Nations 2007j) and the involvement o f the
government in D arfur (United N ations 2007q). For example, in “May 2007[,] Liu Giu
Jin, China’s new D arfur Special Envoy, returned from a visit to the ravaged region and
declared with a straight face that ‘the situation in Darfur is now basically norm al’”
(Prunier 2005:179). By other accounts described throughout this work, Darfur was far
from normal - in 2007 or at any point thereafter. Chinese representatives at the UN and
UNSC often made statements against, as well as abstained or voted against, measures
aimed at forcing the hand o f the Government o f Sudan in term s o f addressing the conflict
(United N ations 2004aj; ak; al; 2005r; 2006n; o; 2007r). ICC C hief Prosecutor M orenoO campo went as far as to make a statement about the level o f Chinese support for Sudan:
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“when Mr. Ocampo had last briefed the Council this past December, it ‘was principally
the obstruction o f the China that prevented the Council from adopting a statem ent'”
(United Nations 2008g:l). Protecting the extensive economic relationship that the two
states share was, and is, in the best interest o f China as can be seen in Chinese statements
and votes throughout the data.
The US was a vocal supporter o f Darfur and the achievem ent o f peace. In fact,
the US referenced D arfur more than any o f the rem aining P5. The US Congress labeled
D arfur genocide in July 2004 (United Nations 2004al). Soon thereafter, the US
representative said, “ It is im portant that we not becom e bogged down over words. It is
essential that the Security Council act quickly, decisively and with unity. W e need to fix
this humanitarian problem now” (United N ations 2004al:4). The US supported AM IS
financially from early in the conflict (United N ations 2004af; am). The US described its
actions related to Darfur in this manner:
President Bush was the first head o f State to speak out publicly on the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur. We were the first to highlight D arfur at the Security
Council, the first to state that genocide had occurred in D arfur and the first to call
for accountability for perpetrators o f violence and atrocities, as well as being a
lead donor on humanitarian assistance, with more than $506 million in food aid to
Darfur and eastern Chad since the Darfur crisis began. We appreciate UnderSecretary-General Egeland’s rem inder o f what rem ains to be done by us all.
(United N ations 2005v: 12)
President George W. Bush labeled D arfur genocide at the UN (e.g., United N ations
2004i; United Nations 2007b). In 2004, Secretary o f State Colin Powell testified before
Congress and called D arfur genocide (Powell 2004b). Also, in 2011, Secretary o f State
Condoleezza Rice also identified Darfur as genocide (United N ations 2012a).
This is interesting when compared to the U S ’ use o f the word genocide, or lack
thereof, to define Rwanda a few years earlier (see Chapter II) (Flint and de Waal 2008;
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Heinze 2007; Jafari and W illiams 2005; Power 2001; 2002). The US used “genocidal
acts” to define the events in Rwanda where 800,000 people were killed in a three-m onth
period in 1994 (Power 2001; 2002). Power (2001:6) explained the US dance around
what she calls “the g-word” :
[a] discussion paper on Rwanda, prepared by an official in the Office o f the
Secretary o f Defense and dated M ay 1, testifies to the nature o f official thinking.
Regarding issues that m ight be brought up at the next interagency working group,
it statedf;] Genocide Investigation: Language that calls for an international
investigation o f human rights abuses and possible violations o f the genocide
convention. Be Careful. Legal at State was worried about this yesterday—
Genocide finding could com mit [the U.S. government] to actually “do
som ething.”
M enneke (2009) also noted this memo in his writings. The US avoided the use o f the
word genocide to define the events occurring in Rwanda at the time for fear o f triggering
an intervention requirement, specifically m ilitaristically, in the Genocide Convention.
This was inconsistent with the US approach to defining Darfur as genocide. In
fact, US Secretary o f State Colin Powell stated; “some seem to have been waiting for this
determ ination o f genocide to take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by
this determ ination” (Powell 2004a; b). This was in stark contrast to the D epartm ent o f
Defense memo noted above. It seems that the Genocide Convention was reinterpreted
between the Clinton and Bush administrations and that “doing som ething” was no longer
required upon application o f the word genocide to a conflict. The Bush adm inistration
was then willing to state that genocide was occurring in Darfur “without an expectation
o f [militarized] intervention” (Heinze 2007:362). The more recent US interpretation o f
the Genocide Convention simply requires some sort o f action to prevent or punish future
genocidal acts, which the US felt was satisfied with its request for an investigation by the
UNSC into the events in D arfur (Flint and de Waal 2008) (see United Nations 2004o; ag).
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This resulted in the formation o f an international com mission o f inquiry, which
culminated in the Report o f the International Comm ission o f Inquiry into Darfur (RIC1D)
(United Nations 20051).
This was self-serving because it satisfied the dem ands for action by several
activist groups in the US but distanced the government from any real action, such as that
which was feared the determ ination o f genocide would engender in Rwanda. This
allowed the US to be seen as a cham pion o f hum an rights while not requiring the
investment o f military or economic resources. The humanitarian goodwill achieved by
requesting an investigation in Darfur was the return earned on a small political
investment by the US. This is an exam ple o f the moral relativism in international
relations as described by Bjola (2009). Based in the neorealist school o f international
relations, and seen here, legitimacy and morality were mutually exclusive.
The US financially supported both the AU and UN missions into Darfur many
times over the course o f the conflict (United N ations 2004n; af; am; 2005q; v; 2006q).
The data also indicated that US representatives at the UNSC often spoke o f the Darfuri
conflict in terms that exhibited a desire to address the situation, as well as called for
action to do so (United N ations 2004i; al; am; 2005c; w; 2006b; 1; m; n; o; 2007r; 20081;
n; 2009d; 2012a). Statements such as “ [t]he Sudan remains a top priority for the United
States” (United Nations 2005v:2), “ [e]nding the violence in Darfur rem ains one o f the
highest priorities for the United States” (United N ations 2006q:10), and “ [t]he brutal
treatment o f innocent civilians in Darfur is unacceptable to the United States” (United
Nations 2007q:7) also evidence the US position on the conflict. A dditionally, “ President
Bush made a promise to the people o f D arfu r...‘[t]he United States will not avert our
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eyes from a crisis that challenges the conscience o f the w orld’” (United N ations
2007q:8). Other statements, such as “ [i]n Sudan, innocent civilians are suffering
repression; and in the Darfur region, many are losing their lives to genocide...The United
N ations must answ er this challenge to conscience “ (United N ations 2007b:9), “ [t]his
Council cannot ignore the terrible crim es that have occurred throughout the conflict in
D arfur and the massive human suffering that the world has w itnessed” (United Nations
2005u:8), and:
[c]an we in conscience leave the people o f Darfur to such a fate? Can the
international com munity, having not done enough for the people o f Rwanda in
their time o f need, ju st watch as this tragedy deepens? H aving finally agreed —
ju st one year ago — that there is a responsibility to protect, can we contem plate
failing yet another test? Lessons either learned or not, principles either upheld or
scorned, this is no time for the m iddle ground o f h alf measures or further debate.
(United N ations 2006o:3)
The US made many statements about addressing Darfur and allotted funds to do
the same. However, this appears to be to appease the dem ands o f the public in America
in relation to Darfur. The US, as with other countries, took a symbolic appeasement
approach to maintain legitimacy while ensuring state interests dictate action. The US was
so over-extended militarily that it could not or would not com m it soldiers. Senator, and
Presidential candidate, John Kerry explained lack o f m ilitary intervention in Darfur in
this way during a presidential debate in Septem ber 2004 (New York Times 2004:13, 15):
Senator Kerry: ... And the world is more dangerous. D arfur has a genocide. The
world is more dangerous. I'd have made a better choice...
Mr. Lehrer: New question, two minutes. Senator Kerry, you mention Darfur, the
Darfur region o f Sudan, 50,000 people have already died in that area, more than a
million are homeless. It has been labeled an act o f ongoing genocide, yet neither
one o f you or anyone else connected with your cam paigns or your adm inistration
that I can find has discussed the possibility o f sending in troops. Why not?
Senator Kerry: Now, with respect with Darfur, yes, it is a genocide. And months
ago, many o f us were pressing for action. I think the reason that we're not saying
send American troops in at this point is several fold. No. 1, we can do this through
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the African Union, providing we give them the logistical support. Right now all
the president is providing is humanitarian support. We need to do more than that.
They've got to have the logistical capacity to go in and stop the killing. And that's
going to require more than is on the table today. 1 also believe that it is - one o f
the reasons we can't do it is we're overextended. Ask the people in the armed
forces today. W e've got guards in reserves who are doing double duties. W e've
got a backdoor draft taking place in Am erica today. People with stop-loss
programs where they're told you can't get out o f the military. Nine out o f our 10
active duty divisions committed to Iraq one way or the other, either going, com ing
or preparing. So this is the way the president has overextended the United States.
The political rhetoric indicated a desire to end the conflict but the words did not seem to
match the action. C ohen’s (1975) cost versus benefit analysis is applicable as the US
would not com mit militarily
This divide between the US words and actions, other than financial contributions,
appeared to be politically motivated. W ith the reinterpretation o f the Genocide
Convention to satisfy demands for action by US activists, the US took the approach o f
persuasive and often support o f addressing the conflict while it avoided intervention that
might require investment other than financially. In addition, the US endorsed the R2P in
relation to Darfur in stating that:
[ujnless security improves, we face the prospect o f having to drastically curtail an
acutely needed humanitarian operation. Can we in conscience leave the people o f
Darfur to such a fate? Can the international com munity, having not done enough
for the people o f Rwanda in their time o f need, ju st watch as this tragedy
deepens? Having finally agreed—ju st one year ago— that there is a responsibility
to protect, can we contem plate failing yet another test? Lessons either learned or
not, principles either upheld or scorned, this is no tim e for the middle ground o f
h alf measures or further debate. (United Nations 2006o:3)
Sudan was characterized as “a top priority for the United States” (United N ations
2005v:2). The US applied economic sanctions against Sudan due to the Darfuri conflict
(United Nations 2010a). In 2006, the US sent a Special Envoy to D arfur in an effort to
aid the peace process (United Nations 2006a). The US sought intervention and aid to
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Darfur from early on and throughout the conflict. Yet. realpolitik played a m ajor role in
the discourse and action taken by the US in relation to the conflict in Darfur.
Here again, the issue is related to the situation o f the United States and its ongoing
war on terrorism and efforts to ensure protection o f US interests, including the potential
backlash to the former political adm inistration and the illegalities that were com m itted in
A fghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo. Consider, for exam ple, the US did not agree with the
referral o f Darfur to the ICC because o f the idea the that ICC “should be able to exercise
jurisdiction over the nationals, including governm ent officials, o f States not party to the
Rome Statute... strikes at the essence o f the nature o f sovereignty” (United Nations
2005u:3). The US abstained on the referral vote (United N ations 2005u). A few months
later, the US representative stated:
[wjhile our concerns about the Court have not changed, we would like to move
beyond divisiveness on the issue. We share the com m itm ent o f parties to the
Rome Statute to bring to justice those who perpetrate genocide, w ar crim es and
crimes against humanity. W hile we have honest differences on how accountability
is best achieved, we m ust work together to ensure that perpetrators o f the
atrocities are held accountable for their actions. (United N ations 2005h:10)
In further protection o f sovereignty, several P5 members spoke o f
desiring/requiring consent by the GoS before proceeding with interventions. The Russian
Federation (RF) abstained in the vote to transition to UNAM ID without GoS consent
(United Nations 2006n:9). The Russian Federation made several com m ents during the
discussions about obtaining consent and cooperation o f the host governm ent before
proceeding— here again, a position used to neutralize potential threats to their domestic
self-interests and protection. There were also several discussions related to sanctioning
the GoS for failure to abide by UNSC resolutions and the ICC arrest warrants. The
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Russian Federation abstained from voting in relations to sanctions (United Nations
2004aj; 2005t).
Recall that the discourse related to Darfur was dom inated by the United States. In
fact, the US had alm ost twice as many mentions in the data than the second most vocal
P5 state, China. France and the United Kingdom followed respectively, leaving the
Russian Federation with little participation in the discourse and offering less in terms o f
political arguments that undergirded voting behavior. This may be related to the P5
consensus with the other states often explaining their voting behavior, while the Russian
Federation chose not to do so. It is most likely that the Russian Federation simply had
fewer com peting interests, desires, or political statements that needed to be vocalized in
terms o f its voting behavior.
Alternately, the voting behavior o f France and the UK was discussed at length.
Both states indicated less attention to the protection o f Sudan’s sovereignty in an effort to
achieve peace - aligning more with the historical position o f the two countries (post
colonialism). France’s voting behavior and discussions indicated a desire for peace and
accountability in Darfur. It supported the responsibility to protect in Darfur-related
discussions at the UN (United Nations 2006a). France never labeled the conflict in
Darfur genocide in the docum ents reviewed in this work, but it did fully support
com pliance with the arrest warrants issued by the ICC (United N ations 2008g; 2011).
Additionally, French President Sarkozy moved “twenty-fifth France- Africa Summit to
avoid meeting with a person who is the object o f an arrest warrant” (United Nations
2010c:3). France also linked the R2P to Darfur (United N ations 2006a). When
UNAM ID supplanted AMIS, France commented:
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[t]he com ing months will be critical to responding to the high expectations
elicited by today’s decision and to ensuring that Darfur is no longer, as it is today,
a synonym for despair, distress and violence. Let us live up to the challenge by
remaining united and by contributing to and cooperating jointly in this long-term
effort. France is more than ever resolved to do so. (United N ations 2007q:5)
France also voted in favor o f the resolution renewing the UNAM ID m andate that
included condem nation o f al-Bashir, as noted in the previous chapter (United N ations
2008g; United N ations Security Council 2008).
The UK was a strong supporter o f the peace process in Darfur and aided in the
AMIS mission from early in the conflict (United N ations 2005q). In fact, the UK drafted
the transition to UNAM ID resolution (S/RES/1706) (U nited N ations 2006p). W hen it
was passed, the UK stated that, “ [t]he resolution gives the United N ations force in Darfur
a clear Chapter VII mandate to use all necessary means to protect civilians” (United
N ations 2006n:3). Further, it explained that, “ [t]he United Kingdom was at the forefront
o f efforts to secure this [the R2P]. We are very pleased that this is the first Security
Council resolution mandating a United Nations peacekeeping operation to make an
explicit reference to this responsibility” (United N ations 2006n:4). A representative from
the United Kingdom stated that:
there is still a gaping hole in our ability to address the illegitimate threats and use
o f force against innocent people. It is to our shame that the international
community did not act in Rwanda. Darfur shows the urgent needs that yet have to
be met. Today there are 28,000 African peacekeepers. But if we are to honour
[sic] our responsibility to protect behind borders where there are atrocities, we
need to ensure more systematic support for peacekeepers, and we need to build
the capacity o f vulnerable nations to prevent conflict. (United N ations 2008k:8)
Although the UK representative did not specifically call D arfur genocide here or in other
docum ents in the sample, there is inference in his statement through his reference to
Rwanda.
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Both France and the United Kingdom supported the referral to the ICC (United
Nations 2008g). The French representative stated: “ [i]ndeed, resolution 1593 (2005) is
based on the fact that the crimes com mitted in D arfur are o f such gravity that, according
to the pream ble o f the Rome Statute, they threaten the peace, security and well-being o f
the w orld” (United N ations 20081:3).
While the referral to the ICC was shrouded in controversy at the P5, it was not
nearly as much as the indictm ent o f al-Bashir - both the first arrest w arrants for crimes
against humanity and w ar crim es and the subsequent arrest warrant for genocide (see also
Chapter VI). A w ell-known point o f contention for the RF was the indictm ent o f
President al-Bashir (United Nations 2008m). The RF representative explained:
we note that the IC C ’s issuance o f a warrant for the arrest o f the President o f the
Sudan, Omer A l-Bashir [sic], does not contribute to a peaceful settlem ent in
Darfur. It is well known that the African Union favours [sic] full guarantees for
the safety and security o f the President o f the Sudan: in other words, progress in
the negotiations takes priority over the judicial process, because it is considered
that activities under the slogan o f judicial fairness are underm ining the ongoing
peace process. And there can be no doubt that the process is ongoing, albeit with
certain com plications. (United N ations 2009c:6)
In another statement, the RF ended its remarks related to the ICC and D arfur with
“ [hjowever, we would call on him [M oreno-Ocampo] to carefully weigh his steps in his
work on D arfur and to calibrate them with the challenges o f achieving peace and
improving the humanitarian situation” (United N ations 2009d:9).
The UK took issue with the condem nation o f al-Bashir em bedded in the
UNAM ID m andate renewal resolution, explaining, “ [w]e will not stand in the way o f a
Security Council discussion o f whether there is a case for invoking article 16 o f the Rome
Statute in relation to President Al-Bashir [sic], but that discussion will raise profound
questions about the relationship between peace and justice” (United N ations 2008m:3).
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A mere four months later, the UK was concerned about the lack o f action associated with
the ICC arrest warrant for crimes in the Darfur and urged Sudanese cooperation with the
ICC (United Nations 2009d). The UK voting behavior indicated the state desired a
balance between sovereignty and protection o f citizens in Darfur - again, highlighting the
importance states place on their actions in relation to their vested interests, especially
when those contradict com peting interests and moral obligations. One o f which was the
legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy o f the UN and the UNSC, especially at a tim e when
calls had been made to com pletely restructure the UNSC, expanding the voting rights o f
global South states. Several discussions revolved around the idea that D arfur became a
critical issue in assessing whether the UNSC could remain relevant and effectivelegitimacy. In early 2007, the Slovakian representative stated:
[w]e believe that the emergence o f new threats to international peace and security
requires the constant attention and regular adaptation o f the Security Council and
its working m ethods to the new security environment. That is particularly true for
some o f the most daunting challenges, such as the upsurge in terrorism , the
proliferation o f weapons o f mass destruction, and massive intra-State conflicts
with the potential to destabilize entire regions, such as the crisis in Darfur. It is
our jo in t responsibility to intensify our efforts to achieve tangible progress in our
work, which should bring people more peace and security, better respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and greater prosperity. Words,
statements and proclamations need to be transformed into practical measures,
making a real difference on the ground. Otherwise, the entire United N ations
system, including the Security Council, will lose its relevance and credibility.
(United Nations 2007o:6)
Darfur began to be identified as a test for the existing structure and effective
functioning o f the UN and UNSC as well as the organization’s legitimacy. When the
UNSG explained that “ [t]he most acute o f these challenges is, o f course, Darfur. Not
only are innocent lives at stake, but also the authority o f the Security Council, the image
o f the United Nations in the Arab world and the credibility o f the United N ations”
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(United Nations 2007m: 1). The word “Darfur” was one o f the 100 m ost searched words
on the website o f the United N ations in 2006, indicating that others were paying attention
to the manner in which the situation was being addressed by the body, adding additional
pressures for state action, resulting in the strain previously noted (United N ations 2004b).

SUM M ARY
One document, the Report o f the International Com m ission o f Inquiry into Darfur
(RICID), was the foundation o f all UNSC actions. This 2005 report identified Darfur as
crimes against humanity and this definition was never revisited despite m ounting
evidence o f genocide and arrest w arrants issued by the International Crim inal Court.
Data indicates that the RICID provided the opportunity for the UN and UNSC to state
that responsibilities engendered by the UN G enocide Convention had been fulfilled,
which permitted the body to navigate around the required intervention trigger in the
Convention. The labeling o f the conflict as crim es against humanity rather than genocide
rendered the Convention useless outside o f the investigation and determ ination o f crimes
against humanity. Use o f this definition allowed the UNSC to avoid required intervention
while applying other interventions to the conflict. This single docum ent provided the
avenue for the UNSC to go through the m otions but avoid meaningful and effective
intervention in D arfur despite the calls for “no m ore” genocide after the H olocaust - and
Srebrenica - and Rwanda. Realpolitik was evident in at least two m em bers o f the UNSC
P5 and was a useful in understanding the data at hand.
The central theme uniting the findings and theoretical com ponents o f the
integrated theory o f state crim e may be summed as com peting interests (M erton 1949;
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Rothe 2009b) - morally, financially, in terms o f resources, and in term s o f political will.
Both individual states and organizations made up o f individual states were trying to
meets many goals and many needs at the same time (M erton 1949), and maintaining
and/or increasing pow er and legitimacy was the primary mission. Cohen (1975)
identified power as the central goal o f every state and the findings here buttressed that
concept. Power was wielded both individually and by states collectively in UN and
UNSC. The com peting interests o f m orality versus legitimacy were also evident in the
term s that M orgenthau (Bjola 2009; Kissinger 1977; Yunus 2003) described where
morality was in the survival-of-the-fittest rather than a more traditional form o f morality.
For states, morality was that w hich perpetuates the state itself at the current level or to an
increasing level o f pow er and domination. The politics and pressures that states
experienced at the international level diluted the individual level ideology and/or morality
o f protecting innocents in other states.
It is here that realpolitik (von Rochau 1972 [1853]) was seen in the data as the
China and the US exhibited a focus on their own military, political, and economic
supremacy at the cost o f others. This neorealistic desire for dom ination and power
dictated decisions made at the individual and collective level and indicated the states own
self-interest above all else in decision-m aking in relation to the conflict in Darfur. The
most strategic actions were those that maintain state power and all other decisions were
made at the deference o f that pow er (W ayman and Diehl 1994). W ayman and Diehl
(1994) identify humanitarian interventions as the least strategic o f state decisions, and the
relegation o f these interventions fall victim to the lust for power and “domination
relations” (G um plow icz as cited in Aho 1975:49). Support for this concept was found in
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the data in relation to the lack o f meaningful and effective intervention in Darfur. The
morality o f effective intervention and protection o f life in Darfur simply could not
compete with the other, more primal, and self-serving interests o f the P5 individually,
which was also manifest in the collective decision-making o f the UN Security Council.
Data indicates that the variable o f realpolitik exerted a great am ount o f influence on
Chinese and US decision-making in relation to Darfur.
The data in this work provided a strong foundation for adding the variable
realpolitik to the Rothe (2009b) integrated theory o f state crim e model. It proved to have
explanatory power o f state reactions to the behavior o f other states, especially in relation
to the economic and political interests o f China and the political and m ilitary interests o f
the US. It was also central to placing the decision-making discourse by the UN and
UNSC into context and understanding why such decisions were made. A dding the
variable to the model and uniting the international relations and crim inological literature
allows bridges to be built between the two bodies o f literature. In some instances these
bodies o f work may be far apart; as evidenced in this project, the two are critically related
and the bridges between the bodies o f literature will only strengthen the explanatory
power o f both in situations like Darfur and other conflicts.
Likewise, the perceived definition o f the situation impacted voting behavior,
though at times, as noted above, they contradicted each other, draw ing on term s such as
sovereignty and governmental consent. The perceived definition o f the situation dictated
the labeling and the labeling was the center o f the discourse analysis here. The focus on
crimes against humanity and war crimes based on the RICID findings dictated decision
making behavior from that point forward. The definition o f the situation remained
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unchanged from two years into the conflict despite how the conflict evolved over time
and outcries from the public and NGO to act during the protracted violence.
These activist and NGO dem ands for greater intervention into Darfur caused
strain for the UN and P5. Each o f the P5 had their own self-interests that required
balancing with decisions related to the conflict. These com peting interests, as noted
above, indicated that the P5 used realpolitik to ensure that their own state interests were
satisfied before becom ing involved in the needs o f other states. At times, this meant
words o f support and encouragem ent without financial or m ilitary support. At other
times this strain was m anifest in protection o f econom ic interests despite the violence in
the region.
This strain also led to a diffusion o f responsibility. These strained P5 members
could state their desires to aid the victim s o f D arfur and to stop the violence in the region
without being required to put action behind the words. P5 members who continually
voted in ways that indicated realpolitik and primacy o f their own self-interests m eant that
some P5 states could do nothing more than express concern and desire for more
meaningful interventions. This diffusion o f responsibility allowed states to practice
realpolitik and to pacify any dem ands o f their own constituency to intervene by m aking a
vocal effort for intervention despite the diffusion o f responsibility and dilution o f
individual votes when a P5 consensus was required on important measures.
This P5 consensus and diffusion o f individual responsibility that is inherent
therein is vital to this work and is an area in which policy change would make the UNSC
function more effectively. The following chapter will discuss additional im plications
from this analysis in term s o f policy.
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CHAPTER VIII
POLICY IM PLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

This work has led to two m ajor policy implications: the Genocide Convention is
useless due to the way in which it was written and the UNSC requires restructuring to
avoid the realpolitik that permeates its current structure.
The Genocide Convention is a utopian docum ent written on the heels o f the
Holocaust, a time in which em otions were high, as were dem ands for accountability and
assurances that such atrocities would “never again” be permitted. There have been
several genocides since and none have effectively invoked the Genocide Convention for
protection o f those harmed. The Rwandan genocide entailed the death o f 800,000 in the
short span o f three months. Darfur was, and continues to be, the slow death o f hundreds
o f thousands over the course o f a decade. If the Genocide Convention cannot address
either, it is useless in its current form.
The Genocide Convention was first invoked in Darfur (United N ations 2004aj).
This work explained in detail, in many ways, how little that meant. The investigation
under the Convention labeled the crime in a way as to prevent further action. Even
International Criminal Court arrest warrants for genocide provoked no further action by
the UNSC. The Genocide Convention was written in a way that ties its hands and makes
the docum ent ineffective. The required intervention trigger means nothing if simply
naming the conflict something other than it is allows circumnavigation o f the docum ent as was the case in Darfur.
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New m echanism s for addressing genocide are required. Since the cries o f “never
again” after the Holocaust and the creation o f the United Nations Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment o f the Crim e o f G enocide (1948), genocide occurred in
Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and now in Darfur. Some scholars would also include
Burundi and Uganda, among others. The Responsibility to Protect shows prom ise but if
not effectively administered, it could end in the sam e fate as the Convention - moral and
utopian in ideal and supported by many, but with no teeth and com pletely unenforceable.
The R2P can be seen as an ideology that reduces the strain experienced by the practice o f
realpolitik in lieu o f com peting interests. The R2P is merely a docum ent that states that
certain behaviors by states are unacceptable and should be prevented/stopped/punished.
W ithout clear dictates as to when intervention is required and what types o f interventions
are permitted, the R2P is merely a broader and updated version o f the Genocide
Convention. W ithout such specific alterations, the R2P docum ent itself and the ideology
behind it are as easily circum vented through labeling o f conflicts at the international level
as was the Genocide Convention in this case.
The Genocide Convention and the R2P are not the only problem s. The current
structure o f the UNSC has many flaws that im pede its efficacy. More specifically, the
UNSC is structured in a way that gives much pow er to a few and places m ajor decisions
related to conflict intervention and other matters in the hands o f the most powerful states
in the world - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom o f Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States o f America. Certain decisions by the
group require an affirm ative vote from all five o f these perm anent m em bers o f the
Security Council. A simple abstention, or declining to vote, renders the Council unable
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to proceed on such matters. The Report o f the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change in 2004 explained that:
[t]he biggest failures o f the United N ations in civil violence have been in halting
ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Rwanda, Secretariat officials failed to provide
the Security Council with early w arning o f extremist plans to kill thousands o f
Tutsi s and m oderate Hutus. W hen the genocide started, troop contributors
w ithdrew peacekeepers, and the Security Council, bowing to United States
pressure, failed to respond. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, United Nations
peacekeeping and the protection o f humanitarian aid became a substitute for
political and m ilitary action to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide. In Kosovo,
paralysis in the Security Council led the N orth Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) to bypass the United Nations. Only in one instance in the 1990s - in East
Tim or - did the Security Council, urged on by the Secretary-General, work
together with national Governm ents and regional actors to apply concerted
pressure swiftly to halt large-scale killing. (United N ations 2004x:34)
Similarly, the UN Secretary-G eneral’s report on the events in Srebrenica detailed failures
by the UN and international com munity in the prevention or stoppage o f the conflict in
Srebrenica. It described a:
g u lf between m andate and m eans... pervasive am bivalence within the United Nations
regarding the role o f force in the pursuit o f p eace....an institutional ideology o f
im partiality even when confronted with attempted genocide... range o f doctrinal and
institutional issues that go to the heart o f the United N ations ability to keep the peace
and help protect civilian populations from armed conflict. (United Nations
1999b: 108)
In Rwanda, “ [t]here was a persistent lack o f political will by M em ber States to act, or to
act with enough assertiveness. This lack o f political will affected the response by the
Secretariat and decision-m aking by the Security Council” (United Nations 1999a:3). All
o f these statements indicated that the pow er placed in the hands o f a few, with their own
national agendas and self-interests at heart, leaves those being harmed by their
governments to suffer while the UNSC debates. In the case o f Darfur, the debate
continues despite the hundreds o f thousands killed and m illions displaced. The position
o f the P5 may be explained in this way: “ [i]f you can exploit the UN to your own
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national advantage then do so; otherwise keep it at arm ’s length to avoid unwelcom e
constraints” (Simons 1995:57).
Totten (2013:219) sums the role o f realpolitik, state reaction, and the P5 in this
manner:
many, if not most, o f the P5’s votes regarding intervention in genocide in the past
have been driven by realpolitik. In other words, the P5 have not been concerned
prim arily with the fate o f the potential victim s o f genocide but much more
focused on whether intervening would be good for them selves or their allies. As
the cliche goes, nation states do not have consciences. Concom itantly, the type o f
mission— Chapter VI (peacekeeping) or Chapter VII (peace enforcem ent) o f the
Charter o f the United N ations— is largely dictated by the P5 as well. Thus, instead
o f sending a robust mission in a timely fashion with a mandate that allows the
m ission’s troops to handle a jo b properly, the P5 play politics and often approve
m issions that are sorely inadequate for the job. This is true for a whole host o f
reasons, but the main point here is that the P5 virtually take on the God-like role
o f deciding who will live and who will die.
This type o f concentrated pow er in the hands o f a few means that im portant international
decisions may not be the result o f broader international consensus.
To effectively maintain international peace and security, the UNSC must be
restructured to balance the power o f the Council overall. The ten rotating m em bers allow
states that may not have great am ount o f power internationally to have a role and to play
a part in the organization that seeks to serve all members, while also no longer catering to
the most powerful nations. The rotating o f the ten also permits a variety o f viewpoints
and ideas to come to bear at the Council. Simply allowing all 15 m em bers o f the UNSC
to vote on all matters and changing the consensus requirement o f all P5 states on certain
matters would easily distribute the power more evenly and require little to no change
other than during voting. Alternately, all UNGA members could get a vote - one per
country - with a majority vote required for a matter to be approved. These two could
also be combined with the majority o f the 15 UNSC and a majority o f the UNGA
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required to pass important measures. Either o f these options makes the UNSC function
more equitably and takes the pow er from the few and spreads it more evenly to the many.
This more equitable distribution o f voting power at the UNSC (and possible
inclusion o f the UNGA) means that states that rely on realpolitik have a diluted impact on
decision-making. The international relations body o f literature makes it clear that states
will protect themselves and their interests first. However, some o f the sm aller states will
have less interest to protect, which may make them more open to intervention when
needed rather than the diffusion o f responsibility seen in the current P5 consensus model.
The current P5 structure is made up o f the w ealthiest and most well protected
states. The data here indicates that this colors their voting through the lens o f realpolitik.
Permitting Rwanda or Burundi or Yugoslavia to vote on how to react to massive
violations o f human rights gives those with first-hand experience o f such violence a voice
in preventing it from happening to others. Smaller states may not be as focused on self
protection and protection o f sovereignty as the wealthiest P5. This perm its the voice o f
the many to speak rather than ju st the voice o f the most powerful. Diluting the voting
power o f the w ealthiest and most powerful would surely bring a new focus to the UNSC
and im pact decision-making. The United N ations was established after the Holocaust to
unite states to prevent sim ilar events from occurring. The current structure o f the P5 and
required consensus prevents that. The data indicates that the P5 are focused on self
protection - specifically the protection o f their pow er and legitimacy. Not all states have
this hyper-focus on sovereignty, power, and legitimacy. States with less pow er and
wealth do not have to spend as much time and energy protecting such interests at the
international level as do the P5 states. Allowing all states to unite in voting at the United
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N ations would surely bring more equity, as well as reducing the current reliance on
realpolitik and sovereignty at all costs that were evident in the P5 discourse and decision
m aking throughout this sample.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Future research in this area may explore conflicts com parable to D arfur to
determine if similar conclusions are drawn. Research into the UN and UNSC labeling
and discourse related to Rwanda (before the conflict was posthum ously determined to be
genocide) may be interesting to com pare and contrast to this work. Additionally,
conflicts such as Kosovo or Syria may be o f interest to understand if the contextual
discourse related is similar to the findings here. The world is filled with conflict, thus
works that may be compared and contrasted to the findings here may be found in every
decade previously and, without change to the current way in which the conflicts are
addressed, in decades to come. This may provide the opportunity to determ ine if the
findings here are generalizable to similar conflicts.
In that vein, additional research may also delve into ways in which conflicts are
identified and labeled domestically by the P5 in com parison to how the same conflicts are
identified by those same members at the UN and UNSC. For example, the US called
D arfur genocide in Congress and in the UN. Future research may uncover some
disconnect in the m anner in which conflicts are identified domestically because there are
no repercussions to those labels, versus those that have repercussions in the international
arena at the UNSC.
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Finally, future research may focus on N GO s/IG O s and their impact on the
definitional process at the UNSC. Many o f these organizations made statem ents at the
UN identifying Darfur as genocide. However, this did not appear to im pact the decision
making by the group. Projects focused on the international impact, or lack thereof, o f
these organizations may be able to place the groups in a better position to leverage any
influence that they may have at the UNSC. These groups are not bound by international
politics and focus on human rights as their sole mission. Their ability to bring data to the
UNSC and help the group make better-inform ed decisions that are less driven by politics
and realpolitik may aid in ending future conflicts before they rise to the level o f genocide
and millions o f lives are lost.

CONCLUSION
The overarching conclusion o f this work may be best summed in this way:
“[wjhen you see that the advisor thinks more about him self than about you, and that in all
his deeds he seeks his own self-interest, such a man as this will never be a good adviser
and you will never be able to trust him ” (M achiavelli [1532] 1979:154-5). The UNSC
exhibited realpolitik and self-serving behavior in many w ays throughout the data. They
used Bourdieu’s ([1982] 2003:164) “symbolic pow er [of language]...that invisible pow er
which can be exercised only with the com plicity o f those who do not want to know that
they are subject to it or even that they them selves exercise it.” M achiavelli ([1532] 1979)
raises an important point - in this context, if those tasked with maintenance o f
international peace and security place their own state-interests first in decision-m aking,
how can the world trust such decision-makers?
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A /63/2(SUPP)

07/31/08

S/P V.5947

07/31/08

S /R E S/1828

08/12/08

Press Conference

09/19/08

Press Conference on Developm ents Relating to
International Criminal Court Investigation in Darfur, Role
o f Security Council

09/24/08

A /63/53/A dd.l

09/25/08

A/63/PV.10

10/06/08
10/15/08

A/63/PV.20
S/RES/1841

10/31/08

A/63/PV.35

11/11/08
12/02/08

S/2008/647
A/HRC/9/28

12/03/08
12/17/08

S/P V.6028
GA/AB/3885

01/30/09

S/2009/61

02/10/09

S/2009/83

02/18/09

A /H R C /10/30

02/19/09

S/2009/100

03/16/09

Press Conference on Expulsion o f Non-Governm ental
Organizations from Darfur

03/20/09

S/PV.6096

05/14/09

GA/AB/3903

05/20/09

S /R E S /1870

05/29/09
06/05/09

S/2009/277
S/PV.6135

07/13/09

S/2009/353

07/24/09

S/PV.6170

07/27/09

S/2009/388

07/28/09

A/64/181

08/06/09

S/RES/1881
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Date

UN Document N um ber/Identification

09/07/09

A/64/356

10/13/09

S/RES/1891

10/29/09

S/2009/562

12/04/09

S/PV.6230

03/12/10

S/AC .47/2010/1

04/09/20

A /H R C /14/26

05/26/10

A /H R C /14/41

06/11/10

S/PV.6336

07/20/10

S/2010/387

07/30/10
08/16/10

S/RES/1935
SG /SM /13062-AFR/2023

08/19/10

A/65/313

08/24/10

A/65/324

09/30/10

S/2010/501

10/14/10
10/14/10

S/PV.6397

12/09/10
12/16/10
12/17/10

S/P V .6440
S/PV.6452
A/HRC/5/SR.7

12/23/10
23/30/10

S/2010/668
S/2010/679

01/07/11

S /2011/7

01/18/11

S/PV.6468
A/65/752

02/23/11
03/08/11

S/RES/1945

S/2011/111

05/10/11

S/PV .6531

05/17/11

S/RES/1982

05/19/11
06/08/11

A/HRC/17/NGO/1
S/PV.6548

07/20/11

S/PV.6587

07/22/11

S/PV.6589

07/29/11

S/PV.6597

07/29/11
08/19/11

S/RES/2003
A/66/309

08/22/11

A /H R C /18/40

08/24/11

A/66/321

09/09/11

S /2011/509

12/15/11

S/PV.6688

12/30/11

E/CN.4/2005/SR.53

143

UN Document N um ber/Identification

Date
01/09/12

S/2012/8

01/09/12

S/2012/9

02/15/12

A/66/695

02/17/12

S/RES/2035

02/20/12

E/CN.4/2005/SR.60

03/20/12

S/2012/166

04/04/12

S/2012/190

06/25/12

S/PV.6790
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF ACRONYM S

AI
AMIS
AU
CPA
DPA
EU
HRW
GoS
ICC
ICISS
ICTR
IGAD
IGO
GoNU
IDP
JEM
M INURCAT
NGO
OAU
P5
R2P
RAF
RICID
RPF
RF
SLA
SPLM /A
UK
UN
UNBISNET
UNCHR
UNGA
UNGC
UNHCHR
UNODS
UNMIS
UNAM ID
UNSC
UNSG

Amnesty International
African Union M ission in Sudan
African Union
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Darfur Peace Agreement
European Union
Human Rights W atch
Government o f Sudan
International Criminal Court
International Comm ission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Intergovernmental Authority on Developm ent
Intergovernmental Organization(s)
Government o f National Unity
Internally Displaced People
Justice and Equality M ovement
United N ations M ission in the Central African Republic and Chad
Nongovernmental O rganization(s)
Organization o f African Unity (also known as the African Union)
Permanent Five
Responsibility to Protect
Rwandan Armed Forces
Report on the International Com m ission o f Inquiry into Darfur
Rwandan Patriotic Front
Russian Federation
Sudan Liberation Army
Sudan People’s Liberation M ovement/Army
United Kingdom o f Great Britain and N orthern Ireland
United Nations
United Nations Bibliographic Information System
United N ations Comm ission on Human Rights
United N ations General Assembly
United N ations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the
Crime o f Genocide
United Nations High Com m issioner on Human Rights
United Nation Official Document System
United Nations M ission in Sudan
African Union - United Nation M ission in Darfur
United N ations Security Council
United National Secretary-General
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US
W SOD

United States o f America
World Summit Outcom e Document
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APPENDIX C
PERM ISSION TO USE COPYRIGHTED M ATERIAL

On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 2:04 PM, Patrick Abbott < patrick.abbott@ gm ail.com > wrote:
Dr. Overton,
By all means! I consider anything on the blog fair game for any citation. If you have
any further issues feel free to contact me. By the way, I won't blog about it but could you
send me a copy o f your dissertation? It sounds interesting! Thanks for reaching out!

-Patrick Abbott
909 N ew Jersey Ave SE - Unit 417
W ashington, DC 20003-5305
(202)355-3979

On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 1:00 PM , A ngela Overton <aoverton@ gsu.edu> wrote:
Hello.
I wrote my dissertation on UN non-intervention into the genocide in Darfur. I used the
map image on this page http://ww w .geographictravels.com /2011/07/south-sudan-worldsnewest-country.htm l. I did credit you as the source. However, now my university is
requiring that I obtain your permission to use it in my dissertation. M ay I include the
map, with your permission?
Please advise with questions. Thank you.
Angela Overton, Ph.D.
Clinical Assistant Professor
Department o f Criminal Justice and Criminology
Georgia State University
140 D ecatur Street
Atlanta GA 30303
Urban Life 1222 (404)413-0095
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D epartm ent o f Sociology and Criminal Justice
Old Dominion University
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Education
Doctor o f Philosophy, Crim inology and Criminal Justice
2014
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Dissertation: The D arfur Name Game: Use o f Realpolitik by the United N ations in
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M aster o f Science in Criminal Justice
2008
University o f Tennessee at Chattanooga, Chattanooga, Tennessee
Bachelor o f Science in Criminal Justice
Kennesaw State University, Kennesaw, Georgia

2005
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Clinical Assistant Professor, D epartm ent o f Crim inal Justice and Crim inology
Georgia State University
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Instructor, Department o f Criminal Justice, Social and Political Science
Old Dominion University
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Instructor, Departm ent o f Sociology and Criminal Justice
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